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 The executive political ideology literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity 
because social and economic issues are conflated. This has created an inconsistency in empirical 
findings with the theoretical predictions of the political ideology construct. In this dissertation, I 
identify a distinct economic component, free market orientation, based on support for economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights to reconcile these inconsistencies. Specifically, I 
argue that these indicators of free market orientation will have a unique impact on the way 
executives run their organizations. I develop a novel scale that measures CEO economic values 
that I term free market orientation and demonstrate its distinctness from a broad political 
ideology construct of CEO liberalism-conservatism. To do so, I conduct a content analysis of 
firm earnings conference calls to measure three indicators of free market orientation of CEOs – 
economic individualism, competition, and property rights. As an initial demonstration of the 
significance of CEOs’ economic ideology, in the sample of 140 CEOs who were appointed to 
their positions in years 2008 and 2009, I also develop and test the idea that CEOs’ free market 
orientation will influence their firms’ extent and type of income smoothing strategies, defined as 
an attempt on the part of the firm's management to actively manage earnings toward a 
predetermined target. Specifically, I argue that free market oriented CEOs are more likely to 
engage in income smoothing and choose income smoothing strategies with the least harm to 
shareholder value but of more risk to themselves – discretionary accounting accruals. Thus, by 
engaging in income smoothing and choosing among certain earnings management strategies (real 
activities, accretive stock repurchases, or discretionary accounting accruals), free market-
oriented CEOs not only display their ability to take greater risks but also their focus on the 
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 The increased globalization in recent decades and rise of transnational corporations 
whose operations transcend their home country jurisdictions, increasingly heightens scholarly 
and public attention to the societal role of corporations beyond their wealth-generating function 
as evidenced with the burgeoning number of research on social responsibility of corporations. 
More recently, researchers explore these questions through the prism of executive political 
ideology– the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. operationalized as the opposites of 
the conservatism-liberalism spectrum.  
Specifically, the conceptualization of executive political ideology along the liberalism-
conservatism continuum has opened ample opportunity for upper echelons research to immerse 
into executive value thinking and beliefs about these fundamental societal. Owing to burgeoning 
research in this domain, we know that executive political ideology influences organizational 
CSR activities, pay structure, resource allocation decisions, and even performance outcomes of 
their organizations. Albeit with the richness of organizational outcomes associated with the 
executive political ideology, this research has produced empirical inconsistencies with the 
theoretical thinking that leaves us at a loss as to our ability to peer into the black box of 
executive attributes associated with executive value systems.  
These inconsistencies stem from overtly focus of executive political ideology on the 
psychological needs and biases that are known to predict an individual’s views on social issues. 
In so doing, however, it pays insufficient attention to managerial values and beliefs about 
economic issues. This is problematic because an individual’s social and economic values are 
increasingly understood to be distinct dimensions of one’s political ideology. Thus, the continued 




puzzle in upper echelons research but hinders organization scholars’ fuller understanding 
executive value thinking about underlying roles and responsibilities of corporations in a today’s 
society.  
Specifically, overtly focus on executive psychological needs or biases in understanding 
the impact of executive values and beliefs on organizational outcomes or conflation of these 
needs with economic values, undersells the salience of executive economic worldview or beliefs 
in shaping those decisions. Thus, critical questions such as whether a corporation engages in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), tax avoidance, 
tax sheltering or debt financing and investments is largely considered through the prism of either 
psychological characteristics attributed to one’s social values or as a combination of both social 
and economic value thinking without underlying rationale which dimension of political ideology 
is in action. This is puzzling given economic values are not only independent dimension of 
political ideology but also figure prominently in other research streams that consider an 
individual’s economic value systems influence country or institutional arrangements. Thus, 
overlooking this aspect of political ideology on an organizational level with overtly focus on 
psychological biases or insecurities in upper echelons omits purposeful value thinking of the 
decision makers and their commitment to certain economic systems as the desired mechanism 
for targeted organizational outcomes.  
In this three-chapter dissertation, I attempt to address this theoretical gap in upper 
echelons literature, by focusing on the overlooked role of executive economic values, which are 
largely distinct and independent dimension of executive political ideology.  Specifically, in 
Chapter I of the dissertation, I identify a distinct economic component of executive political 




property rights to reconcile these inconsistencies. Specifically, I argue that these dimensions will 
have a unique impact on the way executives run their organizations. By synthesizing current 
research, I reinterpret extant political ideology research findings through the prism of executive 
free market orientation and offer suggestions for future research. 
In Chapter II of the dissertation, to further advance empirical research in this overlooked 
domain of political ideology research, I introduce a novel scale that measures the economic 
values of CEOs that I term free market orientation and demonstrate its distinctiveness from a 
broad political ideology construct of liberalism-conservatism. To do so, I apply a Computer 
Assisted Textual Analysis (CATA) technique to firm earnings calls to measure three indicators 
of free market orientation – economic individualism, competition, and property rights, as well as 
utilize a unique dataset from the CATO Institute to assess the robustness of this novel measure. 
Finally, in Chapter III of the dissertation, as an initial demonstration of the significance 
of CEOs’ economic ideology, in the sample of 140 CEOs who were appointed to their positions 
in years 2008 and 2009, I develop and test the idea that CEOs’ free market orientation will 
influence their firms’ extent and type of income smoothing strategies, defined as an attempt on 
the part of the firm's management to actively manage earnings toward a predetermined target. 
Specifically, I argue that free market oriented CEOs are more likely to engage in income 
smoothing and choose income smoothing strategies with the least harm to shareholder value but 
of more risk to themselves – discretionary accounting accruals. Thus, by engaging in income 
smoothing and choosing among certain earnings management strategies (real activities, accretive 
stock repurchases, or discretionary accounting accruals), free market-oriented CEOs not only 
display their ability to take greater risks but also their focus on the primacy of current 




 Taken together, Chapters I, II, and III contribute to research on upper echelons research 
by attracting scholarly attention on the overlooked role of executive economic values or free 
market orientation, which is a distinct and independent dimension of executive political 
ideology. Chapter I presents theoretical arguments for a scholarly need to explore executive 
economic values or free market orientation. Chapter II introduces a novel scale to measure 
executive free market orientation via computer assisted textual analysis technique as well as 
distinguishes it from the traditional liberalism-conservatism measure of political ideology. 
Chapter III provides a test of the idea that CEOs free market orientation will influence their 
firms’ engagement in income smoothing and a choice of income smoothing strategies.  
Throughout the dissertation, I discuss the implications of an understanding of executive 
free market orientation for advancing upper echelons research as well as re-interpreting current 





II. Chapter I: Free market orientation as a distinct dimension of executive political 
ideology 
A. Abstract 
The current political ideology literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity: social 
and economic issues are conflated with overwhelming focus on psychological needs. This has 
created inconsistency of empirical findings with theoretical predictions of political ideology 
construct. I identify a distinct economic component, free market orientation, based on support 
for economic individualism, competition, and property rights to reconcile these inconsistencies. 
Specifically, I argue that these dimensions will have unique impact on the way executives run 
their organizations. By synthesizing current research, I reinterpret extant political ideology 
research findings through the prism of executive free market orientation and offer suggestions 
















The conceptualization of political ideology along the liberalism-conservatism continuum 
– the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. operationalized as the opposites of the 
spectrum – has broadened the management research of organizational outcomes attributed to 
executive values and beliefs (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Increasingly, 
however, this broad conceptualization fails to shed light on some intriguing organizational 
outcomes associated with Republican- and Democratic-leaning executives. To illustrate, while 
this research stream considers Republican-leaning executives as risk-averse individuals 
(Christensen, Haliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015) with a higher need for security and status quo 
(Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014) and intolerance for change (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 
2013), recent findings suggest that Republican-leaning executives not only display a behavior 
inconsistent with these traits, such as greater tax evasion (Francis, Hasan, Sun, & Wu, 2016), 
corporate wrongdoings (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015), and actions attempted to change their 
environment (Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016), but also were found to deliver overall better 
organizational financial outcomes at least in the short run than their Democratic counterparts 
(Jiang, Kumar, & Law, 2016; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017). Relatedly, 
while this conceptualization portrays Democratic-leaning executives as caring about the 
environment, social issues, and justice (Briscoe et al., 2014), they were found to engage in more 
securities and intellectual property rights litigations (Hutton et al., 2015) and be less prudent with 
shareholder or investor funds than their Republican counterparts (DeVault & Sias, 2017). 
These findings are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of extant political 
ideology construct, which predominantly focuses on the psychological needs that are known to 




Noel, 2014; Fedlman & Johston, 2014). In so doing, however, it overlooks the effect of 
managerial values and beliefs about economic issues. Thus, critical questions such as whether a 
corporation engages in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta, 
Briscoe & Hambrick, 2017a), mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Elnahas & Kimn, 2017), tax 
avoidance (Christensen et al., 2015), tax sheltering (Francis et al., 2016) or debt financing and 
investments (Hutton et al., 2014) have been limited largely to either managerial intolerance of 
ambiguity and uncertainty (e.g. Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 
2017) or  aversion to social change and diversity (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014).  
Economic values, however, are increasingly known to be an independent and salient part 
of an individual’s political ideology (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Malka, Lelkes, & 
Soto, 2017). The emerging research suggests that while conservative and liberal social values are 
associated with right and left wing economic issues accordingly among political elites (Zaller, 
1992), this association is weak or negative among a general population (Stenner, 2009), and the 
association emerges only from the actions of political leaders (Malka et al., 2017). Specifically, 
general consensus among political scientists suggest that ideological divisions into the left and 
right spectrum emerge because of ideological packaging by party political elites of various issues 
to attract broad coalitions than can win elections (see Miller & Schofield, 2008; Noel, 2014). 
Thus, while some individuals may see liberalism and conservatism as primarily about social 
issues, others may understand the dimension in terms of economics (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; 
Noel, 2014; Johnston, Lavine, & Federico, 2017). Importantly, individuals’ attitudes across 
social and economic issues, while often weakly correlated, remain statistically independent in the 
U.S. sample but have no meaningful or even a negative correlation in samples from the rest of 




While donations to the Republican and Democratic parties are used as a proxy for 
conservatism and liberalism, the supporters of these parties represent a broad, fragmented 
coalition of individuals with at times conflicting social and economic values (Miller & Schofield, 
2008). Both economic and social conservatives tend to support the Republican Party. While 
economic conservatives care more about free enterprise and limiting the role of government 
(Feldman & Johnson, 2014), social conservatives give more salience to the role of social values, 
morality, and religion in the society with no objection to the expansionary role of the government 
in economic issues (Johnson & Tamney, 2001; Noel, 2014). Similarly, the Democratic Party 
includes many social liberals who carry free market-oriented views while remaining liberal on 
social issues (Miller & Schoefiled, 2008). As such, managers that donate to the Republican and 
Democratic parties may possess abstract beliefs which guide their behavior and preferences on 
social and economic issues, but they do not necessarily see a higher-order convergence between 
these political preferences into a broad political ideology construct (Feldman & Johnson, 2014). 
This is especially true because managers of large and diverse corporations are often the 
subject of political ideology research (e.g., Gupta et al., 2017a, 2017b; Chin & Semadani, 2017). 
I have a reason to expect that these managers are more likely to be highly educated, open to 
diversity, and subjected to rigorous filtering within organizational ranks before the succession to 
the upper echelons. While a career and succession in a diverse and complex organization may 
not make a Republican a Democrat, I assume it makes him or her somewhat more cosmopolitan, 
more comfortable with social diversity and change. As such, while critical organizational 
decisions, such as CSR activities, M&As, tax avoidance, debt leverage and investment decisions 
may partly reflect an individual differences in aversion to risk (e.g. Christensen et al., 2015, 




Briscoe et al., 2014), but may also demonstrate economic values as to desired mechanisms to 
achieve individual and organizational outcomes. Thus, the goal of my paper is to identify the 
distinct effect of overlooked role of economic values in organizational outcomes that is currently 
conflated with social values in management research. 
 I argue that an individual’s free market orientation, which reflects one’s economic values 
and beliefs, is critical in addressing limitations associated with the current conceptualization of 
political ideology. Rohrschneider (1996) outlined that some important components of an 
individual’s economic values are the belief in the right to own private property, the right to profit 
maximization, the premise that meritocracy should govern the distribution of income, and the 
superior efficiency of competition (Rohrschneider, 1996). Accordingly, free market orientation 
represents a spectrum of values on the supremacy of an individual autonomy, competition, and 
private property and reflects the set of widely shared beliefs about the advantage of market 
mechanisms in matters affecting society and interaction among particular actors. Thus, a defining 
feature of an individual’s free market orientation is the three core values directly relevant to an 
individual’s economic values: economic individualism, competition, and private property 
(McClosky & Zaller, 1984).  
 While economic individualism refers to the belief that people should get ahead by 
themselves and be self-reliant, competition refers to the belief that rivalry among parties is a 
means for advancement and economic progress. Property rights, a third integral component of an 
individual’s free market orientation, reflects an individual’s belief in one’s right to own 
unlimited property and allocate it at his or her discretion. Generally, by having a higher faith in 
free market principles and limited role of government in society than their Democratic 




legislators may be argued to have higher free market orientation than their counterparts. Thus, 
differences between Republican and Democratic-leaning managers in a choice of degree of debt 
leverage and investments (Hutton et al., 2014), M&As (Elnahas & Kim, 2017), argued as 
differences in risk-aversion (Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017), may in fact also 
represent dissimilarities in views on economic individualism. Similarly, their differences in a top 
management team (TMT) compensation structure (Chin & Semadani, 2017), CEO pay level 
(Gupta & Wowak, 2017) and internal resource allocation (Gupta et al., 2017b) argued as 
differences in psychological attribution biases (Chin & Semadani, 2017; Gupta & Wowak, 2017) 
may actually represent dissimilarities in the belief in tournament-style competitive environment 
and meritocracy. Finally, their differences in CSR expenditure (Chin et al., 2013; Digui & 
Kostovetsky, 2014; Gupta et al., 2017a) and responsiveness to CSR activities (Briscoe et al., 
2014), argued as differences in aversion to social change (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017a), 
may also reflect their dissimilar views on the societal responsibility of a corporation (Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). 
 This paper suggests a number of contributions to the current political ideology research in 
the management literature. First, I argue that the current conceptualization of political ideology 
conflates social and economic values that creates inconsistency of empirical findings with the 
theoretical predictions. Thereby, I argue that managerial social and economic values cannot be 
packaged into a single broad liberalism-conservatism continuum (Malka et al., 2017; Feldman & 
Johnston, 2014; Noel, 2014). By this, I extend political ideology research in management, 
suggesting a more fine-grained understanding of managerial political values and beliefs. Second, 
I synthesize the existing research on political ideology in organizations that has developed 




highlight the limitations of the current conceptualization of political ideology and offer a novel 
approach that reconciles some of the conflicting findings of the current research. More 
specifically, I challenge the current conceptualization of Republican managers as risk-averse 
individuals with high intolerance for change and diversity by relaxing the social conservatism 
assumption and suggesting that, in fact, variation in free market orientation of Republican and 
Democratic-leaning executives may impact their distinct corporate strategies. Thus, this novel 
conceptualization may shed light into the findings from the finance literature on why 
Republican-leaning managers pursue fiscally conservative policies that deliver better financial 
performance at least in the short run (Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017) and better work 
for their clients than their Democratic-leaning counterparts (Jiang et al., 2016). Additionally, it 
may also advance our understanding of why Republican leaning managers, in some situations, 
undertake greater risk to protect shareholder value than their Democratic counterparts (Francis et 
al., 2016; Unsal et al., 2016; Hutton et al., 2015). This contributes to an expanding understanding 
of the black box of mechanisms that tie executive ideology to intriguing organizational outcomes 
(Lawrence, 1997).  Importantly, by introducing a novel construct, free market orientation, to the 
management literature that taps into the often overlooked role of managerial economic values, I 
open up a new avenue of research that could uncover additional important organizational effects 
attributed to managerial free market orientation.  
 
C.  Defining Political Ideology 
The conceptual success of political ideology research in business disciplines rests on the 
fact that political ideology is treated as a unidimensional construct along the right and left 




Assembly proponents of the king sat on the right of the chamber, whereas those opposed sat on 
the left (Bobbio, 1996; Laponce, 1981). Political psychology researchers largely adopted these 
distinctions. As such, the right metaphor came to represent acceptance of the status quo, i.e. 
hierarchy, and of traditional values, i.e., religion, whereas the left indicates social change and 
egalitarianism (Jost et al., 2003). While individuals on the left were understood as proponents of 
social change and egalitarianism in political, economic, and social life, right-wing individuals 
represented support for the status quo, hierarchy, and traditional values (Jost et al., 2003).  
Jost and his colleagues (2003) using the above mentioned traditional divide into 
conservatism and liberalism suggest that ideological beliefs are psychologically motivated and 
argued that the variation in the core human needs for security, certainty, and order will determine 
whether an individual becomes a conservative or liberal. According to their influential motivated 
cognition theory, need for security, certainty, and order will determine an individual’s support 
for both traditional social and moral values and support for in-egalitarian status quo or 
capitalism. As such, according to Jost et al. (2003) due to the need for security and certainty, 
conservatives demonstrate high resistance to change and tolerance of inequality as the status quo, 
whereas liberals advocate social change and egalitarianism.  
The unidimensional nature of political ideology has gained even more popularity largely 
due to the historical divide in western countries between the left and right on the spectrum of 
political issues since the French revolution (Jost et al., 2008). Particularly, in the U.S. two-party 
system, the Republican Party reflects respect for traditions, religion, and inequality, representing 
conservatism (Bonanno & Jost 2006; Poole & Rosenthal, 2007). In contrast, the Democratic 
Party with its tolerance for social change and advocating for more equal distribution of income 




opposites as well as public availability of individuals’ donation data to these parties has led to 
increased research on political ideology to explore organizational outcomes of this division 
among finance analysts (Jiang et al., 2016); hedge and mutual fund managers (DeVault & Sias, 
2016; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012); TMT (Hutton et al., 2014) and CEOs (e.g., Chin et al., 2013; 
Gupta et al., 2017 a, b).  
By packaging an individual’s beliefs and values on social and economic issues into a 
broad construct of conservatism and liberalism, however, this broad conceptualization of 
political ideology, increasingly, fails to shed light on intriguing organizational outcomes 
associated with Republican- and Democratic-leaning managers. While this research stream 
considers Republican-leaning executives as risk-averse (Christensen et al., 2015) with a higher 
need for security and the status quo (Briscoe et al., 2014) and intolerance for change, ambiguity, 
and diversity (Chin et al., 2013), the emerging research suggests that Republican-leaning 
managers are capable of taking riskier and bolder actions than their Democratic counterparts 
(Francis et al., 2016; Hutton et al., 2015). To illustrate, recent research has uncovered that 
Republican leaning CEOs engage in more tax evasion (Francis et al., 2016), higher corporate 
wrongdoings related to civil rights, labor, and environmental litigations (Hutton et al., 2015), and 
have higher attempt to influence their environment through higher lobbying activities than their 
Democratic-leaning counterparts (Unsal et al., 2016). While these findings may reflect some 
differences between Republican and Democratic leaning CEOs beyond risk-taking, these actions 
are in clear contrast to risk-averse, status quo, and conformant nature of a conservative that has 
largely been described in the unidimensional conceptualization of political ideology (Jost et al., 
2003). Further, Republican-leaning managers by having higher faith in free market principles 




2010) may seem to be quite tolerant of uncertainties and risk, because free market and fierce 
competition generally increases uncertainty and unpredictable outcomes for an individual 
(Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).  
Relatedly, while this broad conceptualization portrays Democratic executives as 
egalitarian and caring about the environment, social issues, and justice (Briscoe et al., 2014), 
they were found to commit more firm related wrongdoings than their Republican counterparts 
(Hutton et al., 2015). For example, Hutton et al. (2015) found that Democratic-leaning 
executives are more likely to engage in more securities and intellectual property rights litigations 
than their Republican counterparts.  
Importantly, the extant political ideology conceptualization does not explain why 
Republican-leaning executives, despite their presumably risk-averse corporate policies overall, 
deliver better organizational financial results at least in the short-run (see Hutton et al., 2014; 
Jiang et al., 2016, and Elnahas & Kim, 2017). Specifically, Jiang et al. (2016) found that 
Republican analysts, despite their fiscally conservative forecasts, produce more accurate 
forecasts, issue more general updates to their clients in general, and more likely to be rewarded 
by institutional investors for their work. Similar results were obtained by Hutton et al. (2014) and 
Elnahas & Kim (2017) for CEOs. Hutton et al. (2014) found that despite fiscally conservative 
corporate policies, Republican CEOs deliver better financial returns. Also, Elnahas & Kim 
(2017) found that despite engaging in fewer M&As, Republican CEOs delivered better 






D.  Two Dimensionality of Political Ideology 
The current broad conceptualization of political ideology overemphasizes psychological 
needs (see Jost et al., 2003), such as need for security, the status quo, intolerance of ambiguity 
and uncertainty (Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017) and 
intolerance of social change (Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014), conflating social and 
economic values that are increasingly considered to be distinct dimensions of political ideology 
(Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Noel, 2014). In so doing, however, it overlooks the salient role of 
executive economic values and beliefs in executive choices, merely acknowledging economic 
values as the demonstration of the degree of support for the status quo (Jost et al., 2003). 
Namely, according to this conceptualization, conservatives support free markets and capitalism 
because of their psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and maintain the status quo, whereas 
liberals may not have those needs, thus displaying lesser support for free market principles (Jost, 
Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003). Interestingly, in favoring free market principles, 
conservatives may seem to encourage uncertainties, change and risk-taking, since free markets 
by encouraging competition and uncertainty may lower a sense of a stability that reduce 
uncertainty and anxiety with change (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). This is in direct contrast to 
conformant and risk-averse depiction of supporters of a free market conceptualized in the broad 
liberalism-conservatism construct of political ideology (see Jost et al., 2003).  
Kerlinger (1967, 1972) argued that an individual’s attitudes differ in terms of their 
“referents,” or focus. More specifically, referents that are important towards one attitude may be 
irrelevant to another. Kerlinger (1967) suggested that “liberal is not just the opposite of 
conservative” but are relatively distinct attitude systems based on different criterial referents 




“liberalism” referents loading on different dimensions and being weakly, negatively correlated 
(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Morgan & Wisneski, 2017).   
Similarly, based on his work on core human values, Schwartz (1992) suggested that an 
individual’s political ideology is comprised of two distinct dimensions. Using data from 20 
countries, Schwartz (1992) derived two broad dimensions of economic and social values. While 
the social dimension defined respect for tradition, concern for personal and national security, and 
preference for conformity against individual autonomy and self-direction, the economic 
dimension was defined by motivations to achieve social rewards, power, and prestige for hard 
work. Schwartz (1992) argued that these dimensions, while possibly correlated in some societies, 
are relatively independent.  
Relatedly, political science scholars have found that individuals not only attribute 
different meanings on the liberal-conservative continuum with respect to public policy issues 
(Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008), but also keep orientations across social and economic policy 
domains largely distinct (Duckitt, 2001; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). 
They have found that people often think in terms of broad ideas within these specific domains 
(Feldman, 1988; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001; Goren, 2001; 2004). Their findings revealed 
that while sophisticated partisans possess both the awareness and motivation to bring their views 
along party lines, for the general population this was not true (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Feldman 
& Johnston, 2014). Thus, individuals with a high degree of political engagement – those who are 
most interested in and informed about political discourse – typically structure their political 
views along a single dimension, but those who are less engaged generally do not (Zaller, 1992).   
Studies by Malka and his colleagues (2014) have shown that individuals with a higher 




government welfare programs. This does not align with the extant conceptualization of political 
ideology that suggests high alignment between socially conservative values and a support for 
free market economic system that advocates for limiting the role of government in the economy. 
In a more recent study, Malka and his colleagues (2017), involving surveys from 99 countries, 
found a negative relationship between support for socially conservative policies and free 
enterprise, supporting their own earlier findings about inconsistencies with a unidimensional 
liberalism-conservatism continuum. This is consistent with past studies by Stenner (2005; 2009), 
who found that support for free market ideals is negatively correlated with social conservatism 
and is generally associated with high tolerance of diversity and change. 
These findings present a challenge to any claim that an individuals’ social and economic 
values directly or organically leads individuals to adopt broad coherent packages of liberal or 
conservative attitudes (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). Instead, the emergence of an overarching liberal-
conservative dimension appears contingent upon exposure to political messaging (Stenner, 
2009), which itself emerges from the actions of political leaders (Malka & Soto, 2014). In fact, 
closer examination of the studies that were used by Jost et al. (2003)’s meta-analysis suggested 
that the measures of conservatism included in the study did not differentiate whether the measure 
reflected economic values or social values (Crowson, 2009). Thus, while some individuals may 
see liberalism and conservatism as primarily about social issues, others may understand the 
dimension in terms of economics, while others may see both domains as relevant to ideological 
categorizations. For example, the study by Ellis & Stimson (2012) demonstrates that many 
people who label themselves conservative actually have liberal preferences on specific policy 
issues. Similarly, the study by Swedlow & Wychoff (2009) found that a significant number of 




while maintaining libertarian views on the economy. Importantly, empirical research in both 
psychology and political science suggests that an individual’s attitudes across social and 
economic issues, while often weakly correlated, remain statistically independent in the U.S. 
sample but have no meaningful or even negative correlation in samples from the rest of the world 
(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Johnston, 1988; Cochrane, 2010).  
This is not to say that some scholars classify conservatism into more than two 
dimensions. For example, Stenner (2009) distinguished among three forms of conservatism: 
social, status quo, and laissez-faire conservatism. According to her while social conservatism 
that she referred to as authoritanism reflects “predisposition to obedience to authority, moral 
absolutism, racial, and ethnic prejudice” (Stenner, 2009: 142), status quo conservatism is 
associated with rigidity, intolerance of uncertainty, and discomfort with new experiences. She 
argues that while social conservatism is primarily about “aversion to difference,” status quo 
conservatism is about “aversion to change” with general theme being “distaste for difference” 
(:148). In contrast, laissez-faire conservatism, according to her, is primarily associated with 
economic equality/inequality and the (re)distribution of wealth. According to Stenner (2005) 
across diverse cultures, while social and status-quo conservatism are sometimes related, laissez-
faire conservatism is negatively correlated with both social and status quo conservatism. 
Interestingly, the historic divide between the Republican and Democratic parties in the 
U.S. is widely studied as a representation of the unidimensional political ideology scale of 
liberalism and conservatism. However, studies of the members of these parties or individuals 
who donate to these parties demonstrate that these parties are a fragmented coalition of social 
and economic liberals and conservatives (Miller & Schofield, 2008; Noel, 2014). These studies 




conservatives and populist religious social conservatives for decades, the growing influence of 
religious right and populism is moving pro-business candidates either to the Democratic or other 
independent parties (Johnston & Tamney, 2001). In fact, studies by Goren (2013) demonstrate 
that two key principles attributed to political ideology, such as the issue of limited government 
and traditional morality logically or empirically are not bound together. Carmines et al. (2012) 
suggest that the traditional Republican and Democrat divide in the U.S. does not account for the 
presence of libertarians, populists, and moderates that tend to vote Democrat or Republican 
depending on the salience of issues for them at a particular point of time. This aligns with 
findings of Noel (2014) who suggested that caution must be exercised when attempting to tie a 
specific ideology to a particular party platforms since parties, especially the Republican and 
Democratic in the U.S., tend to be a coalition of groups with divergent political ideologies. As 
such, executives may possess abstract beliefs which guide their behavior and preferences, but 
they do not necessarily see a higher-order convergence between social and economic values into 
a broad political ideology construct (Feldman & Johnson, 2014).    
This is especially true because highly educated cosmopolitan executives of large and 
diverse public corporations are the subjects of political ideology research. To illustrate, the 
sample of most political ideology research remains large public corporations listed either in 
Execucomp, S&P 500 or the Fortune 500 list (e.g., Gupta et al., 2017 a, b; Chin & Semadani, 
2017). According to a recent study, 38% of the Fortune 500 CEOs from 1996 to 2012 attended 
elite universities, with the criteria being admitting top 1% in ability tests (Wai, 2013). This study 
also found that 67% of Fortune 500 CEOs for years 1996-2012 either attended elite college or 
had a degree from graduate school with one in seven of them attending Harvard University (Wai, 




typical company in 2014 got 48% of total sales outside the U.S., demonstrating the scope of 
diverse cultures these organizations are exposed to (Gross, 2017). Further, a typical CEO or an 
executive of a large public corporation not only has a highly culturally dissimilar customer base, 
but also may have had years of exposure to a multicultural environment and change before 
succeeding to the top. While exposure to diverse markets or a customer base may not make 
managers ethnically or culturally diverse, it likely exposes them to diversity and alternate side of 
the issue. Thus, positions that demand appreciation of multiple diverse perspectives may increase 
their openness to diversity and change. This is evident in the studies of the U.S. Supreme Court 
over the past 50 years that have shown that the Supreme Court nominees move 
disproportionately from socially conservative to more moderate and even liberal stances after 
becoming high-court justices, which has largely been attributed to their higher exposure to the 
other side of an issue (Hanson & Benforado, 2006).  
Thereby, while exposure to more information, higher education and diversity may not 
make a Republican a Democrat, it makes people somewhat more cosmopolitan and more 
comfortable with social diversity and change. Influential works by Stouffer (1955) and Lipset 
(1959) argued that people with higher levels of formal education have more positive and tolerant 
attitudes toward out-groups. Since then, numerous studies have linked education to tolerance and 
support for the civil liberties of out-groups, like Communists, atheists, homosexuals, student 
protesters, and criminals (Stubager, 2008; Vogt, 1997; Bobo & Licari, 1989; McClosky & Brill, 
1983; McCutcheon, 1985; Ransford, 1972), and to more positive beliefs and feelings about racial 
and ethnic minorities (Tsai & Venkataramani, 2015; Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Moore, 1995; 
Quinley & Glock, 1979; Knoke & Isaac 1976; Selznick & Steinberg 1969; Hyman & Sheatsley 




negatively correlated with an individual’s level of education (Stenner, 2005), which tend to be 
relatively high for business executives as suggested earlier. 
Relatedly, individuals with socially conservative values were found to be less oriented 
toward growth and challenge and to take less initiative and responsibility by avoiding uncertainty 
and innovativeness at work (Fay & Frese, 2000). Because succession to the top involves taking 
risks while embracing uncertainty and diversity at lower echelons of the organization, these 
individuals – potentially successful at lower echelons – may not endure in top of the diverse and 
complex organizations that are the subject of current political ideology research. Importantly, 
these executives are largely selected based on their ability to deliver change, take risks, and lead 
their organizations in an environment of increased diversity and change. Given their risk-
aversion and inability to succeed in the workplace (Fay & Frese, 2000), I envision that 
individuals with high social and status quo conservatism can hardly win risky tournaments to 
upper echelons of highly diverse corporations (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Additionally, insights 
from attraction-selection-attrition model (Schneider, 1987) that has been verified in numerous 
studies (Judge & Cable, 1997; Jackson et al., 1991) would also suggest that organizations with 
diverse constituents will select in executives who appear to “fit” their environment. Thus, critical 
organizational decisions at higher echelons of these corporations, such as CSR activities, M&As, 
tax avoidance, debt leverage and investment decisions may not necessarily only reflect 
managerial aversion to uncertainty (e.g. Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & 
Kim, 2017) or social change (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014), but also economic 





Thus, extant conceptualization and operationalization of political ideology in 
management literature conflates social and economic values that are suggested to be distinct 
dimensions of individual’s political values (see Feldman & Johnston, 2013; Malka et al., 2014; 
Malka et al., 2017). As suggested above, other alternative view even suggests that political 
ideology may have three distinct components, such as social, status-quo, and laissez-faire 
conservatism (see Stenner, 2005; Stenner, 2009). Overall, conflation of these distinct dimensions 
and predominant focus on psychological needs, such as need to reduce uncertainty and change, 
has led to empirical findings that are inconsistent with emerging theoretical predictions of 
political ideology research.  
Stereotypes aside, as suggested earlier, there is a reason to expect that CEO economic 
values are likely to be of more critical salience in organizational outcomes than social values. 
Thus, disentangling distinct role of economic values by relaxing social conservatism assumption 
is important to resolve some of extant mismatch between conceptualization of political ideology 
and empirical findings of ideology research.  Thereby, in the next section, I introduce free market 
orientation, as a reflection of managerial economic values that may help resolve inconsistencies 
with the emerging predictions of political ideology research. 
 
E.  Free Market Orientation 
Compared to an individual’s social values, only a few studies systematically looked at an 
individual’s economic values (Free & Cantril, 1967; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Duch, 1993; 
Shiller, Boycko, & Korobov, 1990). As such, similar to the realm of social values, there is no 
fixed set of economic values that exhaustively defines the economic values of an individual 




studies of economic values of a general population across multiple countries (Chong, McClosky, 
& Zaller, 1983; Heath, Evans, & Martin, 1994; Kaase, 1994; Roller, 1994) as well as emerging 
research on an individual’s economic beliefs in political psychology (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Stenner, 2009; Bakker, 2017), Rohrschneider (1996) outlined the 
following belief systems as important components of an individual’s economic values: the belief 
in the right to own private property, the right to profit maximization, the premise that 
meritocracy should govern the distribution of income, the superior efficiency of competition, and 
the premise that allowing some earn unlimited profit advances economic growth.  
The empirical studies of Rohrschneider (1996) were in a German sample that have 
looked at differences between economic values of people in East and West Germany, reflecting 
two extreme opposites on economic issues spectrum. However, multiple analyses of public 
opinion surveys in Britain and the U.S. have consistently demonstrated that economic attitudes 
towards issues such as nationalization, income redistribution, welfare state and government 
intervention vary among individuals, go largely together, and demonstrate an individual’s 
attitude towards free enterprise, inequality in society, and government intervention (Heath et al., 
1994; Fleishman, 1988; Feldman, 1988; Stenner, 2005; 2009).  
A wealth of research in political science and economics attribute variation in societal 
outcomes to economic values of governing parties and governments that demonstrate 
convergence on attitude towards inequality and free enterprise (Bjørnskov, 2005; Potrafke, 2010; 
Potrafke, 2011; Weymouth & Broz, 2013). For example, pro-market-oriented governments were 
found to encourage deregulation (Pitlik, 2007; Duso & Seldeslachts, 2010; Potrafke, 2010), 




private property (Weymouth & Broz, 2013), reduce taxation (Osterloh & Debus, 2012), and 
boost competition in procurement contracts (Hytinen, Lundberg, & Toivanen, 2008). 
Political scientists define these set of beliefs as an individual’s trust in capitalism 
(McClosky & Zaller,1984), while political psychologists primarily have understood these 
attributes as economic (e.g. Bakker, 2017; Crowson, 2009; Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Fleishman, 
1988; Malka et al., 2017) or market conservatism or liberalism (Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008). 
Important institutional outcomes of these premises are the view that government should stay out 
of private markets as much as possible and the belief that market mechanism or supply and 
demand should guide the functioning of the economic system (Free & Cantril, 1967). These 
beliefs stem from the idea, nicely summarized by Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 study that if left to 
run freely capitalism can generate enough wealth to continually raise standards of living off all 
individuals to a decent standard (Schumpeter, 2002). The intellectual roots of these belief 
systems have been formulated by multiple scholars, such as Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo 
and, more recently, Milton Freedman (Free & Cantril, 1967; Devine, 1972). A unifying theme 
across these values or beliefs is the supremacy of market mechanisms over third party or 
government intervention and reflects an individual’s free market orientation.   
Viewed broadly, free market orientation reflects the set of widely shared beliefs and 
values concerning the role of an individual in society in matters affecting the society overall and 
interaction among individuals. As widely shared values and beliefs, the elements of free market 
orientation are evident in an individual’s thinking, behavior and political rhetoric (Gerring, 
1997). The values and beliefs of the individual are maintained over time by the strong 
commitment to these values on the part of the individual (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). While 




individual, these values are generally perceived to be stable over time and only some significant 
environmental and individual shifts may alter these values (Feldman, 2013). This is because 
values and beliefs generally “act as ongoing standards of evaluation” of individual’s actions and 
stable enough to lend consistence to guiding one’s behavior (Feldman, 2013: 603). 
Albeit an overwhelming focus of studies that explore an individual’s free market 
orientation focus on the role of government redistribution in society and government intervention 
(e.g. Heath et al., 1994; Malka et al., 2014), based on past research of an individual’s economic 
values, a defining feature of free market orientation are three core principles directly relevant to 
the individual’s economic values: economic individualism, competition, and private property 
(see e.g., Williams, 1970; Lipset, 1979; Elder & Cobb, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; 
Heywood, 2017). All three of these have been argued to be central to the way in which people, 
particularly in the United States, think about essential features of capitalism or free enterprise 
(see McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Lipset, 1979).  
Economic individualism, the belief that people should get ahead on their own through 
hard work and autonomy, is a core element in the free market orientation of individuals 
(Heywood, 2017; Free & Cantril, 1967). Toqueville observing American value systems 
originally defined an individualistic person as “such a folk owe no man anything and hardly 
expect anything from anybody” (Toqueville, 2003: 506). Individualism advocates hard work, 
self-reliance and a desire to maintain an independence of action (McClosky & Zaller, 1984; 
Feldman, 1988), a clear contrast to the collectivism perspective that considers an individual in a 
network of intertwined relationships (Greif, 1994; Zerbe & Anderson, 2001). An individualistic 
person believes that each person is responsible for his or her own success in life (Feldman, 




Personal achievement, thus, becomes an important component for an individualistic person to 
measure his or her success in life (Feldman, 1988). A contrast of individualism, is characterized 
by interdependence (Singelis, 1994), promotion of group interests at the expense of the personal 
interests, emphasizing duty to a collective or a particular group (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, 1994). 
It also emphasizes reliance on an external network of relationships and preference on informal 
institutions to resolve disputes and contract enforcement (see Triandis, 2018 for a review). For 
example, in a study of medieval traders Grief (1994) evidences how degree of individualism in 
two societies influences the way traders resolved agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Specifically, he finds that while traders with high individualism, Genoese, relied on formal 
contracts between parties to enforce agency relationship between merchants and their agents, 
Maghribi traders, who are argued to be low in individualism, showed preference for informal 
cheating prevention mechanisms as collective punishment.  
Though a multitude of explanations for variations of support for capitalism across 
societies are suggested, economic individualism is considered one of the most distinctive and 
fundamental dimensions of free market orientation and has been noted to be a strong trait of 
support for capitalistic society in America and other capitalist societies (Free & Cantril, 1967; 
McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Devine, 1972; Feldman, 1982). For example, Feldman & Zaller 
(1992) found that three out of four Americans they interviewed about job guarantees and living 
standards invoked individualism as a value in some way (Feldman & Zaller, 1992: 278).  
Individualism is widely cited in explaining the small welfare state and low level of redistribution 
policies in the U.S. (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lipset, 1979). This is in clear contrast to 
collectivism that is common in egalitarian European societies that associate individualism with 




(McClsoky & Zaller, 1984; BBC World Service, 2009). To illustrate, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
demonstrate that while most Americans attribute poverty to lack of individual effort and laziness, 
attributes of individualism, most citizens of Europe consider contextual factors such as luck or 
social and economic factors as the primary cause of poverty. Scholars tap into economic 
individualism dimension of an individual’s free market orientation through studying an 
individual’s attitude towards income redistribution via taxation (Bakker, 2017), support for 
government welfare policies (Treier & Hillygus, 2009), need for labor unions to protect 
employee working conditions (Fleishman, 1988), the role of government in providing jobs 
(Barker & Carman, 2000). 
The companion belief to the economic individualism dimension of a free market 
orientation is a support for just and fair competition.  Free market oriented individuals justify 
inequality in society through equality or parity in competition (Potter, 2009). Its value is as a 
means for advancement rather than an asset itself (Devine, 1972). Proponents of the support for 
competition argue that competition forces individuals to be more efficient and hard-working 
while penalizing idleness and stimulates individuals to work up to his or her abilities (McClosky 
& Zaller, 1984). They further argue that it forces companies to be efficient and design attractive 
products or services, be attentive to consumer needs and satisfy them as efficiently as possible 
with this benefiting the society (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). The competition dimension of free 
market orientation also emphasizes meritocracy in every action, arguing that in true meritocratic 
systems everyone has an equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual 
knowledge, ability, and skills (Castilla & Bernard, 2010). Free market oriented individuals argue 
that meritocracy is not only beneficial for the organization or society, but also for the individual 




intervention, and focusing on market mechanisms, free market oriented individuals believe that 
economic productivity and growth will be maximized (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Polar 
opposite, involves inducing individuals to recognize one another as equals who share basic 
interests and goals (Shwartz, 2006). Individuals are expected to internalize commitment to 
cooperate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare (Triandis, 2018). They expect themselves 
and others to act for the benefit of others. Equality, justice, and mutual interest could be of 
critical significance for the support of alternative to competition. In this form of arrangement, 
that I call cooperation optimal outcome is achieved when the actors in the economy collaborate 
to achieve their goals through “information sharing, monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation” (: 
52). 
A survey of the American population, which generally has a more positive view of free 
market ideas (McClosky and Zaller,1984), has shown that almost 90% of respondents stated that 
“competition keeps a person on his toes” (:122). Similarly, the survey research repeatedly reveals 
that Americans endorse meritocracy at work (Castilla & Bernard, 2010). Hall & Soskice (2001) 
argue that countries with high support for capitalism, such as the U.S. largely rely on the market 
mechanisms, mainly through competitive labor, financial, and product markets, a possible 
demonstration of support for competition, whereas in countries with lesser support for capitalism 
(Kauffman, 2013), such as Germany, national economies rely on mutual cooperation among 
economic actors facilitated by dense network of institutions that may signal a support for 
coordination. In fact, Germany and the United States are often found to follow remarkably 
different practices in terms of executive pay (Sanders & Tuschke 2007) or the involvement of 
labor unions in decision making (Gospel & Pendleton 2003) that might signify divergent 




competition dimension of free market orientation by survey questions on appropriateness of 
meritocracy at work (Castilla & Benad, 2010), capitalism or laissez faire economics as a 
preferential economic system (Zummumbren & Gangl, 2008), and tolerance for inequality in 
society (Bakker, 2017; Fleishman, 1988). 
Property rights, a third important component of a free market orientation, can be seen as 
the economic side of the support for economic individualism and competition. Adam Smith, one 
of the intellectual founders of free market enterprise thinking, argued that a breach of an 
individual's personal property except for assault on his or her body is the next most severe crime 
(Smith, 2017). Committed as they are to economic individualism and competition, individuals 
with free market orientation have little difficulty accepting the idea that each individual ought to 
be free to own property (Smith, 2017). This support for the property rights has typically been 
accompanied by a distrust of big government (Lipset, 1979; Devine, 1972). Along with the 
support for the limited role of government in a free market, respect for property rights generally 
assumes wide support for capitalism as the most efficient economic system to achieve the desired 
outcome and forms one of the basic elements of the American political culture (McClosky & 
Zaller, 1984). 
Free market oriented individuals consider private property the most important element for 
personal autonomy and the bulwark of individual freedom and the source of economic well-
being, incentivizing competition, thereby helping to ensure that an individual maintains 
autonomy (Hayek, 2014). Without property rights, according to property rights advocates, 
individuals would, in fact, lose their autonomy and be unable to make decisions on their own 
(Randolph, 2012). They argue that even for those who lack material property, the right to 




resources that overall benefits individual and society (Randolp, 2012). In contrast, those who 
oppose unlimited property rights though do not generally argue against one’s right to own private 
property, may seek a balance between property rights and “social” rights (Matten & Crane, 
2005). This happens because along with property rights, individuals are argued to have social 
rights, which include “those rights that provide the individual with the freedom to participate in 
society, such as the right to education, health care, or various aspects of welfare” (Matten & 
Crane, 2005: 170). Proponents of this approach argue that private property rights are useful to 
the extent they serve the purpose of securing people’s means of livelihood. However, their 
justifiable limitation rests at the point they infringe on others’ social rights (Beetham, 2017). 
Thus, the relevance of property rights are diminished once they infringe on “social” or “societal” 
rights, i.e. the rights and interests of a broader stakeholder groups. 
In American society where support for free market enterprise is high, more than four out 
of five respondents surveyed in the late 2000s agreed that “private property rights are just as 
important as other rights like freedom of speech and religion” (Associated Press, 2008). 
However, in France, where public expresses lesser support for laissez-faire capitalism (Pew 
Research Center, 2012), only about one out of ten respondents surveyed regarded “the right to 
own property, either alone or in association with others’ as one of their most valued human 
rights” (YouGov.UK, 2016). Thus, in most capitalist societies most individuals may value 
property rights, however, the degree of support for unlimited property rights may vary. Scholars 
committed to measuring an individual’s respect for private property survey individuals on 
appropriateness of taxing the wealth on behalf of the poor (Bakker, 2017), the right to own 
property (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012) or reducing income inequality in the 




Although one certainly might list additional characteristics, the three principles 
highlighted above: economic individualism vs. collectivism, competition vs. cooperation, and 
property rights vs. social rights undoubtedly define important components of the polar ends of a 
free market orientation continuum. At one polar end is the support for an ideal-typical free-
market culture where managers support virtually all of these principles. The opposite pole is 
defined by a set of ideal-typical egalitarian economic values. I believe that one pole resembles 
libertarian views similar to that of Rand Paul, the U.S. Senator from Kentucky, who has a score 
of 88% in opposition to free trade barriers in the libertarian CATO Institute tracking of 
Congressional free trade policy (CATO, 2018). The other pole might reflect the egalitarian, 
democratic socialist, views of Bernie Sanders, the U.S. Senator from Vermont, who has merely a 
score of 8%, meaning that 92% of the time he voted against policies that promoted free trade. 
Thus, while population of most developed capitalist societies, predominant sample for 
executive political ideology research, will generally have higher support for economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights, i.e. be on the higher end of the free market 
orientation spectrum, as suggested above, divergent views on the individualism-collectivism, 
competition-coordination, and property rights-social or societal rights among people of these 
countries persists. As such, the study of the executive free market orientation is likely to open up 
intriguing organizational outcomes attributed to variation in views on free market mechanisms to 
resolve organizational and societal outcomes. 
F.  Executive Free Market Orientation 
In the next section, I will attempt to synthesize, reintegrate and reinterpret the findings of 
previous political ideology research through the prism of executive free market orientation, by 




critical, as suggested above, in light of increasing understanding that social conservatism, 
traditionally associated with psychological needs, may not be aligned with an individual’s 
worldview on economic issues, i.e. one’s economic values (Feldman & Johnson, 2014; Malka et 
al., 2014; 2017). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------------------------------- 
In order for free market orientation to be a useful addition to research on top executives, 
however, there must be a meaningful variance. In this section, I describe what I anticipate the 
free market orientation distribution to be among top executives. I argue that executives, on 
average, have higher free market orientation than the general population, but that they also 
exhibit sufficient variability to allow research on their differences. I anticipate that it will be 
those who have relatively high intrinsic free market orientation at the outset of their careers who 
will advance in business because of the opportunities for personal achievement. This is also 
because most senior executive positions, particularly those in large organizations, are achieved 
by winning a long series of rigorous promotion tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Further, 
institutional environment of executives’ ideology research studies, such as the U.S., may make 
these executives on average more free market oriented (Stenner, 2005). As such, I do not expect 
lower extreme of a free market orientation scale, where executives would express low support 
for economic individualism, competition, and property rights. Despite my assumption that 
executive free market orientation tends to be somewhat higher than in the general population, it 




important to note that not every executive has risen through a series of demanding tournaments 
in highly attractive companies. Some executives head small or medium sized companies; some 
have arrived at their positions through family connections (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999; 
Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001) or politicized processes (Hiller & Hambrick, 
2005); some are in their positions precisely because they are selected for their loyalty and views 
by domineering CEOs, boards, or owners (e.g., see Westphal & Zajac, 2013 for a summary).  
Indeed, anecdotal examples suggest that executives vary in their degree of support of 
market mechanisms in organizational structure and strategy that reflect their free market 
orientation. To illustrate, a CEO of COSTCO which is known for lowest rates of layoffs, 
employee friendly policies, and lowest gap between average wages and CEO pay among industry 
peers and beyond (Stone, 2013), may be considered in a lower tail of the free market orientation 
scale. In contrast, executives at Koch Industries, known for rigor in promoting market 
mechanisms within organizational structure and strategy (The Economist, 2014), may be placed 
at a higher tail of the scale. In short, not every executive is at the very high end of the free market 
orientation scale, which should give adequate variability to study the phenomena even in the 
U.S. executive sample alone. This is akin to arguments put forth by Hambrick and his colleagues 
that while executives generally tend to have higher than average hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997), narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and core-self-evaluation (Hiller & Hambrick, 
2005), they “exhibit sufficient variability” in these constructs “to allow research on their 
differences” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005: 306). Figure 1 displays the distributions of free market 







Insert Figure 1 here 
--------------------------------------- 
As shown, I anticipate that executives exhibit significant range in their free market 
orientation but tend to score higher than the general population. Notably, I expect that a 
significant proportion of executives have free market orientation toward the upper end of the 
scale in a sample of general population.  
Because traditionally a pro-business, limited government and free trade oriented 
individuals have been associated with the Republican Party (Jackson et al., 2003; Koger et al., 
2010), I anticipate that Republican-leaning managers are more likely to have higher free market 
orientation than their Democratic counterparts. I recognize that this assumption may not track 
well with the current Republican Party orthodoxy under President Trump. However, given extant 
empirical political ideology research has been conducted prior to the rise of Trump movement 
when the Republican Party was considered more pro-business (Miller & Schoefield, 2008), it is 
safe to assume that findings attributed to Republican Party in current political ideology research 
is pro-business, limited government and free trade oriented. Thus I argue that the differing 
organizational outcomes between Republican- and Democratic-leaning managers that recent 
political ideology research has uncovered can be argued to be a demonstration of their value 
differences on economic individualism, competition, and property rights that necessitate further 
study.  
I anticipate than one might argue that social values may be equally or more important for 
executives to vote for a Republican or a Democrat. However, my argument follows that given 




executives who undergo succession filtering in highly diverse organization (Schneider, 1987), 
they tend to have relatively homogeneous liberal views on social issues giving economic values 
more salience. Disentangling separate effect of economic values on organizational outcomes is 
of intriguing empirical research question, however, that I attempt to undertake in the second 
paper of my dissertation research. At this point, my goal is to demonstrate how relaxing social 
conservatism assumption may uncover critical organizational effects of executive free market 
orientation and resolve inconsistencies of extant findings with a broad political ideology 
construct.  
I anticipate that executives’ economic individualism will influence their desire to 
maintain the autonomy of their firms. It may influence not only their desire to seek autonomy in 
their decisions, but also commitment to self-reliance for their firms. Corporate strategies that 
may be affected by this desire may involve higher than average company cash hoarding in the 
expectation of a future need, a low firm debt to equity ratio to reduce a firm dependence on 
externalities, corporate political activities to keep government regulation at bay from a firm’s 
actions and diversification of a customer and a product scope so not to become dependent on a 
single entity and/or product. The findings of political ideology research may substantiate some of 
these arguments. For example, Hutton et al., (2014) showed that managers who donate primarily 
to the Republican Party are associated with more fiscally conservative firm policies, as 
characterized by lower debt leverage. Relatedly, Elnahas & Kim (2017) found that Republican- 
leaning CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A activities and they are more likely to use cash as 
the method of payment rather than stocks. Unsal et al. (2016) found that Republican managers 




Although authors interpreted these findings as the evidence of risk-aversion of 
Republican executives (Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017) or of a more self-interest 
(Unsal et al., 2016), these activities may also evidence a strategy by a free market oriented CEO 
to maintain their firm autonomy and independence of action through limiting their debt (Hutton 
et al., 2014), stakeholder (Elnahas & Kim, 2017), and regulatory exposure (Unsal et al., 2016). 
More specifically, lower debt leverage may be an effort by free market oriented managers to 
reduce a firm’s dependence on external creditors. Similarly, the use of cash for M&A may be an 
attempt to limit the control of target firm stakeholders on a focal CEO’s firm future actions. 
Finally, excessive spending on lobbying may be considered a directed effort by free market 
individuals to limit the regulator’s interference in a firm’s actions. 
Further, I argue that executives’ support for competition will not only influence the 
degree of competition within and outside the firm through tournament style compensation 
structure and uneven internal and external resource allocation decisions, as well as competitive 
behavior in the industry, but also a higher sensitivity of pay to prior performance, overall high 
incentive packages, and meritocracy in setting pay of organizational members. This happens 
because executives’ beliefs in competition will determine the degree to which they consider 
incentives an important component in achieving the better organizational outcome and critical in 
maintaining the competitiveness of their firms. Thus, the differences between Republicans and 
Democrats in top management compensation structure (Chin & Semadani, 2017), CEO pay level 
(Gupta & Wowak, 2017) and internal resource allocation (Gupta et al., 2017b) that current 
research has uncovered may be argued to reflect their degree of support for competition within 
organizational structure and strategy. Specifically, Gupta and Wowak (2017) found that 




performance and CEO pay than that of with Democratic counterparts. Also, Chin and Semadani 
(2017) found that Republican-leaning CEOs have higher pay inequity within top teams than their 
Democratic counterparts. Moreover, Gupta et al. (2017b) found that Republican-leaning CEOs 
and organizations favor more uneven allocation of resources among business units than 
Democratic counterparts.  
Although these findings were interpreted as evidence of attribution biases of 
conservatives and liberals (Tetlock, 2000; Gupta & Wowak, 2017; Chin & Semadani, 2017; 
Briscoe & Joshi, 2017), they may potentially signify differing economic worldview or free 
market orientation of Republican and Democratic executives. While Republican managers, due 
to a stronger free market orientation, may have inherent faith in rewarding individual success 
and encouragement of tournament style competition within TMT and a firm business units for 
overall firm benefit, Democratic counterparts, with lesser faith in Darwinian competition at the 
workplace (Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010), may consider it bad for collaboration and team 
work within a firm and perceive incentive inequity demoralizing with potential negative effects 
for team and organizational performance.  
Finally, I anticipate that executives’ support for property rights will influence whether 
managers consider shareholders rights as residual claimants a priority over other organizational 
stakeholders. This is consistent with property rights arguments that consider a shareholder an 
ultimate owner of a focal corporation (Fan & Wong, 2002) because cash flows from share 
ownership are purely residual claims that are due only after all other committed corporate claims 
(e.g., payments to suppliers, wages and salaries to employees and management, and interest and 
principal payments to bondholders) have been met (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Free market 




shareholders “moral rules that apply to private property apply to corporate property” (Freeman, 
Wicks, & Parmar, 2004: 368). Thus, free market oriented individuals will consider that running 
an organization in the foremost interest of shareholders is “the sine qua non of managerial 
decision making, because shareholders are property owners” (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004: 351). 
As such, free market oriented managers are likely to rigorously defend and pursue shareholder 
interest more at the expense of other stakeholders, by favoring “property” over “societal” rights. 
Consistent with their laissez-faire logic, they may believe that the right to accumulate 
shareholder capital and returns provides ultimate benefit to all stakeholders and the society 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).   
Thereby, assuming that participating in social issues beyond a certain point negatively 
impacts shareholder value creation (Hillman & Keim, 2001) and benefits more to management 
that runs these organizations (Friedman, 2007; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2015), free 
market oriented executives are less likely to spend on CSR with no clear organizational paybacks 
and be less susceptible to activist pressures for more CSR. As such, differences in CSR 
expenditure, CSR score, and responsiveness to CSR pressures by Republican and Democratic 
CEOs (Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014) or Republican and Democratic-leaning 
organizations (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Gupta et al, 2017a) that current research has 
uncovered may reflect their dissimilar views about the responsibilities of a corporation.  
While Republican-leaning managers may consider a corporation primarily responsible to 
shareholders, consistent with their higher regard for property rights, their Democratic 
counterparts may consider a corporation accountable to a wider stakeholder group, consistent 
with a higher regard for societal rights.  Similarly, observed differences in civil rights, labor, 




demonstrate the salience of property rights for the former and broader stakeholder or “societal” 
rights for the latter (Hutton et al., 2015). Specifically, Hutton et al. (2015) found that Republican-
leaning organizations were found to engage in more civil rights, labor, and environmental 
litigations than Democratic counterparts. This may demonstrate that Republican-leaning 
organizations are more focused on shareholder whereas their Democratic counterparts pursue 
interests of a broader stakeholder group, including shareholders, which may lead to significant 
overall intentional and unintentional civil, labor, and environmental wrongdoings.  
Importantly, as suggested above, while argued as evidence of risk-aversion, fiscally 
conservative policies, such as low debt to equity leverage (Hutton et al., 2014) and M&As 
(Elnahas & Kim, 2017) by Republican CEOs may be considered a choice in a shareholder-
stakeholder dilemma by Republican and Democratic-leaning executives as well. For example, 
Hutton and his colleagues (2014) found that despite fiscally conservative policies Republican 
leaning CEOs deliver higher financial returns for their firms at least in the short run. A similar 
conclusion is reached by Elnahas & Kim (2017) who suggests that over the five-year period 
following M&A, stocks of firms with Republican CEOs significantly outperform those with non-
Republican CEOs despite Republican CEOs being cautious in their M&A activities. Similar 
results were achieved in another study by Jiang et al. (2016) who found that despite modest and 
conventional forecasts Republican analysts produce better quality research for their clients. All 
this may signify that while Republican-leaning managers prioritize shareholder or owner goals, 
consistent with higher property right value, their Democratic counterparts may pursue interests 
of a broader stakeholder group beyond a shareholder by being focused more on societal rights. 
To sum up, free market orientation may impact executive decision on the better ways to 




falling on the basis of the consequences of one’s decisions and efforts, competition, and 
shareholder supremacy — increases efficiency of organizations and positive societal outcomes, 
their counterparts while agreeing with basic value of these principles may argue that 
overwhelming focus on autonomy, competition and a shareholder may be detrimental for 
organization and society in the long run. 
 
G.  Discussion 
  The concept of political ideology along the liberalism-conservatism continuum has been 
extremely useful in expanding upper echelons research and theorizing. However, this research 
has evolved along multiple streams that produced findings the current conceptualization fails to 
account for. Thus, this paper argues that studying the overlooked role of managerial economic 
values is important to better understand organizational outcomes associated with a CEO or an 
executive’s political ideology. As such, a fuller understanding of an individual’s political 
ideology begins with unpacking how individual’s economic values influence their actions and 
strategies. It is through referring to these ascribed economic values and beliefs on how the 
economy and a free market functions scholars can come to understand inconsistencies with 
extant political ideology research. Thus, economic values or free market orientation is ultimately 
a distinct component of one’s political ideology. 
  While exploration of an individual’s economic values is not new, this paper aims to better 
define these values in terms of a free market orientation and to theorize about the various ways 
executive’s free market orientation influences organizational strategy and outcomes along with 
helping to understand current inconsistencies with political ideology research. Through synthesis 




presented here advances political ideology research by extending understanding the effect of 
economic values and offering an overarching theoretical insight that might inform future 
research.  
  At a fundamental level, this conceptualization generates insights into why Republican 
and Democratic-leaning managers demonstrate behavior inconsistent with traits in a 
unidimensional scale of liberalism-conservatism. This expands our understanding of the black 
box of mechanisms that are at play that explain why organizational members take certain actions 
(Lawrence, 1997). While these ideas can be applied to a wide variety of environments, the 
exploration of organizational consequences of an executive’s free market orientation illustrates 
how this construct is particularly germane for understanding board, TMT, and CEO values that 
infuse organization’s strategy and other various outcomes.  
 This paper suggests that given the subject of political ideology research are executives of large 
corporations, research will benefit more from exploring their free market orientation rather their 
psychological needs that has been found to predict an individual’s social values. This is the case 
because individuals that political ideology research examines are more likely to be open to 
change and uncertainty due to tournament style succession (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) or filtering 
they undergo to rise in organizational ranks (Schneider, 1987). I suggest that an individual has to 
embrace diversity, change, and uncertainty if he or she is to rise in large multinational 
corporations. As such, by relaxing the social conservatism assumption, restricting the need to 
focus on psychological existential needs, this paper highlights overlooked role of economic 
values in understanding mechanisms that impact organizational outcomes. By this it helps to 
resolve limitations of the current political ideology conceptualization in explaining 




  Although the presence of a higher faith in capitalism and free markets in conservatives in 
comparison to liberals has been noted in the current political ideology research (e.g., Chin et al., 
2013; Chin & Semadani, 2017), this has largely been interpreted as the support of the status quo 
or aversion to change (Jost et al., 2003). This paper is the first to my knowledge to highlight 
individual’s economic values as an independent and distinct component of an individual’s 
political ideology not necessarily tied to his or her psychological existential needs. In clear 
contrast to conformant and risk-averse depiction of the supporters of a free market 
conceptualized in the unidimensional liberalism-conservatism construct of a political ideology, 
this paper suggests that free market orientation in fact may seem to encourage uncertainty and 
change (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Thus, an important and potentially generative avenue for 
future research is to empirically investigate the impact of the executive free market orientation, 
i.e. support for economic individualism, competition, and property rights, three dimensions of 
free market orientation, on organizational outcomes.  
 Recognizing that differences in dependence of the organization on its environment emerge from 
CEO’s free market orientation- that is, when he or she has high economic individualism- 
provides direction for an expanded and fruitful research agenda. An interesting question to 
pursue is whether and how this economic individualism is of benefit or harm for long term 
performance of the firm. For example, a CEO high in economic individualism may have strong 
tendencies to maintain autonomy of his or her team that he or she ignores potential useful 
alliances. This is consistent with the findings that Republican CEOs engage in M&As in lower 
rate than their Democratic counterparts (Elnahas & Kim, 2017). Thus, by actively pursuing 
independence of action or autonomy, free market oriented CEOs may be putting their firms at a 




  Also, particularly interesting for future research is further exploration of competitive 
behavior of a free market oriented executives. Tournament style competitive environment within 
organization through high pay inequity and unevenness in internal resource allocation within 
business units may not be the only visible demonstration of the support for competition for these 
executives (Gupta et al., 2017b). This behavior may be present in competitive dynamics of the 
firm as well as it responds to external threats and opportunities. Exploring how a CEO free 
market orientation impacts a firm response to potential competitive attack may enrich both upper 
echelons and competitive dynamics literature. While CEOs with a low free market orientation 
may prefer to counter the attack with the offer of co-operation for a mutual benefit, CEOs with a 
high free market orientation may choose confrontation. More work is needed to advance these 
strands and understand more clearly how free market orientation demonstrates itself in 
competitive dynamics arena. 
 Another intriguing research stream may be a closer look at a shareholder primacy framework 
associated with managerial free market orientation. While free market oriented individuals may 
care about shareholder returns in comparison to other stakeholders, we do not necessarily know 
enough on short vs. long-term horizon spans of free market oriented executives. While we know 
that Republicans, who are likely to be more free market oriented, generate higher returns to their 
companies in the short run (Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017), lesser known about the 
long term effects of their strategies. Future research may immensely benefit from exploring long-
term effects of their choices to pursue shareholder supremacy. 
  Exploring the effect of dimensions of a free market orientation on organizational 
contracting with its suppliers is another intriguing avenue for future research. While we know 




whether they prefer either short-term or long-term contracts with external suppliers.  This is 
because both short and long term contracts could be argued is a means to maintain a firm and 
CEO autonomy from external entities. While short-term contracts may offer flexibility of a 
relationship, important to maintain autonomy, long term contracting may be a way to sustain 
autonomy through limiting oneself from short term market fluctuations. 
 While this paper has argued for independent and complementary effects of beliefs in economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights, potential interactive effects may persist among 
power holders within organization that bear similar free market orientation. One intriguing 
possibility is the interacting effect of board and CEO free market orientation on dividend payout. 
Because free market oriented executives advocate shareholder primacy due to their higher 
support of property rights, free market orientation of the boards may be associated with overall 
higher dividend announcements. However, the economic individualism dimension of a free 
market oriented CEO may actually trump this tendency given a CEO desire to maintain strong 
autonomy from external parties. Future research may greatly benefit from exploring these 
interacting effects of multiple dimensions of a free market orientation. 
  In summary, research on executive political ideology is growing but has produced 
findings that current conceptualization fails to account for. This paper recognizes two 
dimensionality of political ideology, noting the salience of economic values in resolving 
limitations with the current political ideology research. Specifically, exploring free market 
orientation is essential if the focus of political ideology remains managers of large diverse 
organizations. Thus, for scholars who are interested in understanding the effect of Republican 
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Figure 1 The proposed distribution of free market orientation levels in the general 









Table 1 Interpretation of extant political ideology research through free market orientation conceptualization. 
 
 
Author Sample Political ideology conceptualization Key findings Free market orientation 
conceptualization 




excluded SIC 4900-4999 
and 6000-6999 
Openness to change, familiar versus unfamilar 
stimuli, less sensation seeking-behavior, 
aversion to ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
complexity, fear of loss 
Republican managers are likely to have 
lower levels of debt, lower capital and 
research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, less risky investments, but 
higher profitability. 
More shareholder focused 
policies that involves taking 
prudent risk. 
Kaustia and Torstila, 
2011 
unique data sets in 
Finland 
Cognitive dissonance with stock market 
participation 
Left-wing voters and politicians have more 
stock market aversion than right wing 
individuals. 
 No clear implication from 




Largest 3000 U.S. public 
companies, period 2003-
2009 
Environmental protections, anti-discrimination 
laws, affirmative action, employee protection, 
and helping the poor and disadvantaged 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Democratic-leaning organizations spend 
more on CSR than Republican-leaning 
organizations, score higher on CSR rating, 
but accrue negative stock returns and 
decline in ROA. 
Democratic organizations 
have lesser focus on 
shareholder wealth than 
Republican counterparts. 
DeVault & Sias, 2016 201 hedge fund equity 





tolerant of ambiguity, complexity, openness to new 
experiences, uncertainty avoidance, greater need 
for structure and closure 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Liberal hedge funds exhibit preference for 
smaller stocks, less mature companies, volatile 
stocks, unprofitable companies, non-dividend 
paying companies, and lottery-type securities, 
and make large adjustments to their U.S. equity 
market exposure. 
Democratic organizations have 
lesser focus on shareholder 
wealth than Republican 
counterparts. 
Jiang, Kumar & Law 
(2014) 
11,769 finance analysts 







preference for the status quo, resistance to 
change, and cautiousness 
 





Republican analyst is more likely to 
recommend small changes in forecast or 
recommendation and less likely to issue a 
bold forecast. They are also likely to 
produce more accurate earnings forecasts, 
issue more updates in general, and are 
more likely to be selected as institutional 
investor all-star analysts. 
Republican analysts have 
better care of property rights 
and thus produce better 





Table 1 (Cont.) 
Author Sample Political ideology conceptualization Key findings Free market orientation 
conceptualization 
Elnahas & Kim, 2017 12,928 CEO-year 
observations between 
1993-2006’ 1007 firms & 
2100 CEOs 
disposition to preserve the status quo, strong 
external stimulation & engagement in 
sensation-seeking behavior 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Republican CEOs engage in higher M&A 
than Democratic CEOs and more likely to 
use cash to make acquisitions and more 
likely to acquire public firms than private 
firms and from the same industry and avoid 
high information uncertainty acquisitions 
but deliver better performance from M&A 
than their Democratic counterparts. Spend 
more on CAPEX than Democrats. 
Republican CEOs have 
better care of one's property 
rights.  
Unsal, Hassan & 
Zirek, 2016 
2030 unique firms and 
3765 distinct CEOs for 





FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Republican CEOs engage more in lobbying 
through lobbying the greatest number of 
bills and issues, have relatively larger 
lobbying expenditures and employ higher 
number of lobbyists. 
Republicans want to limit 
government intervention 
into the market  by lobbying 
more than Democratic 
CEOs. 
Francis, Hasan, Sun 









favoring tax reduction, smaller size of 
government, and disfavoring wealth 
redistribution. 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Republican CEOs engage in more tax 
sheltering even when their interests are not 
necessarily aligned with those of 
shareholders.  
Republican CEOs have 
better care of one's property 
rights. 
Briscoe, Chin & 
Hambrick (2014) 
LGBT groups, period 
1985-2004 
emphasis on civil rights and associated social 
issues, including diversity, social justice, social 
change and protecting natural environment; 
emphasis on individualism, respect for 
authority, stability, and the status quo. 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Democratic CEOs face more activist 
pressures than Republican CEOs. 
Republican leaning CEOs 
care less of other 







Table 1 (Cont.) 
Author Sample Political ideology conceptualization Key findings Free market orientation 
conceptualization 
Gupta, Briscoe & 
Hambrick (2016) 
Fortune 500 companies 
listed in 2001-2008 
support of social justice, economic equality and 
control over markets; support of individualism, 
ownership rights, and efficiency 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Democratic leaning organizations have 
greater CSR scores. 
Republican leaning CEOs 
care less of other stakeholder 
interests beyond a 
shareholder. 
Chin, Hambrick & 
Trevino, 2013 
A sample of 249 CEOs, 
appointed beween 2004 
and 2006, period 2005-
2009 
concerned with civil rights, sensitivity to social 
issues, such as diversity, social change, human 
rights, and the environment, seeking economic 
equality, social justice, and control over markets; 
emphasis on individualism, property rights, 
efficiency, and free markets, order, stability, 
respect for authority, and the status quo 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Democratic CEOs have better CSR scores 
than their Republican counterparts. 
Republican leaning CEOs 
care less of other stakeholder 
interests beyond a 
shareholder. 
Chin & Semadani, 
2017 
A sample of 176 
CEOs and 685 
compensation committee 
members from S&P 500 
for the period 2007-2010. 
valuing economic equality, social justice, 
planned social change, and market controls; 
emphasis on individualism, free markets, 
property rights, business cases, order, and respect 
for authority 
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Democratic CEOs reduce pay dispersion and 
pay gaps between CEO and non-CEO 
executives. 
Republican leaning CEOs 
emphasize more meritocracy. 




 FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data Republican CEOs are more likely to have 
civil rights, labor and environmental 
litigations, whereas Democratic CEOs are 
more likely to have securities and property 
rights litigations. 
Republican CEOs have better 








Table 1 (Cont.) 
Author Sample Political ideology conceptualization Key findings Free market orientation 
conceptualization 
Gupta, Briscoe & 
Hambrick, 2017 
Fortune 500 companies, 
period 2000-2012 
emphasis on social and economic equality; 
emphasis on efficiency and high tolerance for 
inequality in outcomes 
Democratic CEOs emphasize more equal 
resource allocation among a firm business 
units. 
Republican leaning CEOs 
emphasize more 
meritocracy. 




CEOs, S&P 1500 
companies, period 1998-
2013 
external vs. internal attributions 
  
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 










need to reduce uncertainty and threats, fear of 
losses, aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty  
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Republican-leaning executives engage in 
less tax avoidance. 
 This finding is challenged 
by a later study by Francis, 
Hasan, Sun & Wu, 2016. 
Briscoe & Joshi, 
2017 
Unique data from a large 
law firm 
internal vs. external attributions  
 
FEC: Republican/Democrat donation data 
Gender gap in performance-based pay is 
reduced more for workers tied to 
Democratic-leaning managers. 





MBA and Executive 
MBA students 
 Fair market ideology supporters will 
engage in CSR only when there is a good 
business case for the project. 
Fair market ideology may in 
fact reflect free market 
orientation and better care 








The broad liberalism-conservatism measure that utilizes party donation data, while useful 
in separating an individual’s political ideology along Republican and Democratic Party lines, 
conflates social and economic values. This paper introduces a novel scale that measures the 
economic values of CEOs that I term free market orientation and demonstrates its distinctiveness 
from a broad political ideology construct of liberalism-conservatism. To do so, I apply a 
Computer Assisted Textual Analysis (CATA) technique to firm earnings calls to measure three 
indicators of free market orientation – economic individualism, competition, and property rights, 









The broad liberalism-conservatism measure that utilizes party donations has been useful 
in separating an individual’s political ideology along Republican and Democratic Party lines 
(e.g. Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013). However, it conflates social and economic values that 
are considered independent dimensions of an individual’s political ideology (Feldman & 
Johnston, 2014; Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014, Malka, Lelkes, & Soto, 2017). This has 
led to some inconsistencies in the current political ideology research that limit our understanding 
of the potential impact of executive political ideology on a firm strategy and structure.  For 
example, the extant research portrays Republican-leaning executives as risk-averse (Christensen, 
Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015), with a higher need for security and status quo (Briscoe, 
Chin, & Hambrick, 2014) and intolerance for change (Chin et al., 2013). However, recent 
findings uncover evidence that is inconsistent with these predictions. Specifically, Republican-
leaning executives were found to engage in risky behaviors, such as greater tax evasion (Francis, 
Hasan, Sun & Wu, 2016), corporate wrongdoings (Hutton, Jiang & Kumar, 2015), and actions 
that attempted to change their environment (Unsal, Hassan & Zirek, 2016), which conflict with 
the conformant and status-quo portrayal of a Republican executive. This happens because extant 
theoretical predictions of political ideology are primarily focused on the psychological needs that 
predict an individual’s views on social issues (Jost, Glacer & Kruglanski., 2003; Stenner, 2005; 
Noel, 2014; Feldman & Johnston, 2014).  
Economic values, however, are increasingly known to be an independent and salient part 
of an individual’s political ideology (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Malka, Lelkes, & 
Soto, 2017). These values “act as ongoing standards of evaluation” (Feldman, 2013: 603) and are 




evidence of economic values and beliefs on the way individuals run governments have been of 
scholarly concern for some time among economists and political science scholars (e.g., Pitlik, 
2007; Duso & Seldeslachts, 2010; Potrafke, 2010, Milner & Judkins, 2004; Hyytinen, Lundberg, 
& Toivanen, 2008, Osterloh & Debus, 2012; Weymouth & Broz, 2013), the impact of these 
values on desired mechanisms to achieve organizational outcomes or on organizational strategy 
and structure remains largely overlooked. 
 The goal of this paper is to introduce and validate a novel measure of economic values of 
CEOs that I term free market orientation and demonstrate its distinctiveness from the broad 
political ideology construct. Free market orientation epitomizes a range of values and beliefs on 
the supremacy of an individual’s autonomy, competition, and private property. As such, these 
values reflect the set of widely shared beliefs about the advantage of market mechanisms in 
matters affecting society and in interactions among individuals in society. A defining feature of 
an individual’s free market orientation are the three core values directly relevant to an 
individual’s economic values: economic individualism, competition, and property rights 
(McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Economic individualism refers to the belief that people should get 
ahead by themselves and be self-reliant (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Competition refers to the 
belief that rivalry is a means for advancement and economic progress. Property rights, a third 
integral component of an individual’s free market orientation, reflects an individual’s belief in 
one’s right to own unlimited property and allocate or use it at his or her discretion. 
Through the development and validation of a free market orientation construct I will 
contribute to the current political ideology research in management in multiple ways. First, by 
introducing a novel technique to measure free market orientation, I open up a new avenue of 




values of organizational leaders. While economic values or philosophy has been shown to have 
an important effect on the way political leaders run political systems (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2005; 
Potrafke, 2010; Potrafke, 2011; Weymouth & Broz, 2013), this has been a less explored 
phenomenon in organizational studies literature. Thus, by developing and validating a free 
market orientation scale, I allow for testing the effects of economic values on critical 
organizational decisions, such as CSR activities (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017), mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As; Elnahas & Kim, 2017), tax avoidance (Francis et al., 2017), debt 
leverage (Hutton et al., 2014) and investment decisions that not only broadens executive political 
ideology research, but also allows for empirical analysis of an alternative explanation as to 
desired mechanisms employed to achieve individual and organizational outcomes. Second, by 
constructing a free market orientation scale that reflects an individual’s economic values and 
setting it apart from a traditional liberalism score (Chin et al., 2013), I highlight the limitations of 
the broad measure that may not account for the differences within broad political groups such as 
the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. Third, by utilizing a Computer Assisted 
Textual Analysis (CATA) technique to measure free market orientation, I contribute to 
broadening the adoption of this technique by management scholars when an unobtrusive measure 
of the construct is the preferred approach. 
 The paper is divided into three sections. First, I briefly summarize three main dimensions 
of free market orientation – economic individualism, competition, and property rights. In the 
second section of the paper, I describe how I intend to utilize a CATA technique to measure 
these three indicators of an individual’s free market orientation (see Short, Broberg, Cogliser, & 
Brigham, 2010 for a review). I also intend to validate the scales obtained from CEO earnings 




that draws from a unique dataset from the CATO Institute, a libertarian public policy research 
think tank. This dataset tracks the voting record of Congress on free trade and subsidy related 
policies, ranking members of Congress on their degree of support of free trade and subsidies; i.e. 
overall support for market principles. Thus, utilizing the donation record of CEOs to these 
Congressional members, I will test the concurrent validity of my CATA based a free market 
orientation scale. As a final step, I intend to calculate a liberalism-conservatism scale, consistent 
with Chin et al. (2013), to demonstrate the discriminant validity of a novel free market 
orientation measure. Finally, in the third section of the paper, I will discuss findings from this 
scale development and validation exercise and offer suggestions for future research. 
 
C. Theoretical Background 
Economic values that I term free market orientation represent an individual’s belief in a 
capitalistic economic system (McClosky & Zaller, 1984) or a spectrum of values on the 
supremacy of individual effort, self-reliance, competition, and private property, traits 
traditionally associated with a free enterprise system. Previous research in political psychology 
and political science primarily understood these views as economic (e.g. Bakker, 2017; Crowson, 
2009; Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Fleishman, 1988; Malka et al., 2017) or market conservatism or 
liberalism (e.g., Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008). The favorable view of market mechanisms among 
individuals in a society is a basic tenet of individuals’ free market orientation (Free & Cantril, 
1967). These beliefs align well with ideas of such political and economic philosophers as Adam 
Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, and Milton Friedman who believed that the invisible hand of free 
enterprise can produce better organizational outcomes to society than the bureaucratic 




the right to own private property, the opportunity to maximize profit, the premise that 
meritocracy should govern the distribution of income, and the superior efficiency of competition 
have been argued to be important components of an individual’s free market orientation (see 
Rohrschneider, 1996, for further discussion). Deregulation of the economy (Pitlik, 2007; Duso & 
Seldeslachts, 2010; Potrafke, 2010), pro-free trade and pro-competition policies (Milner & 
Judkins, 2004; Hyytinen, Lundberg & Toivanen, 2008), reduced taxation (Osterloh & Debus, 
2012) and higher perceived security of private property (Weymouth & Broz, 2013) can be 
considered as some of the outcomes associated with free market orientation of individuals 
running governing coalitions.  
As suggested earlier, three core principles – economic individualism, competition, and property 
rights (see e.g., Williams, 1970; Lipset, 1979; Elder & Cobb, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; 
Heywood, 2017) – are central to an individual’s free market orientation. Economic individualism 
refers to the belief that individuals should be autonomous and self-reliant (Heywood, 2017; Free 
& Cantril, 1967). Thus, it suggests that self-reliance and a desire to maintain autonomy is 
essential for individual success and one’s failure and success is attributed to an individual’s past 
behaviors and actions (McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Feldman, 1988). Personal achievement is 
important to measure personal success in life (Feldman, 1988). Economic collectivism or 
interdependence, in contrast to economic individualism, advocates that an individual is in a 
network of intertwined relationships (Greif, 1994; Zerbe & Anderson, 2001). Promotion of a 
collective interest at the expense of an individual one (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, 1994), a 
favorable view of interdependence, and an emphasis on reliance on collective institutions to 
resolve contract disputes is important for collectivism. Collectivists may trust these communal 




and other positive externalities (Greif, 1994). Thus, they may not see a problem in engaging into 
strong interdependence to advance mutually beneficial goals. 
 Economic individualism is considered to have strong support in American society and 
other capitalist countries throughout the world (Free & Cantril, 1967; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; 
Devine, 1972; Feldman, 1982). Three out of four Americans interviewed by Feldman and Zaller 
(1992) suggested individualism as an important individual value. As such, individualism is often 
suggested as an explanation for limited welfare and redistribution policies in the U.S. (Jacobs, 
2008, King, 1973; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lipset, 1959). In contrast, most individuals in more 
egalitarian European countries with collectivist policies associate individualism with self-interest 
or selfishness and demonstrate lower levels of support for free market principles (McClsoky & 
Zaller, 1984; BBC World Service, 2009). While most Americans attribute poverty to lack of 
individual effort and laziness – attributes of individualism most citizens of Europe consider 
contextual factors such as luck or social and economic factors as the primary cause of poverty 
(Alesina, Glaeser, & Glaeser, 2004). 
 Competition, the second important dimension of an individual’s free market orientation, 
refers to the belief that rivalry among parties is a means for advancement and economic progress. 
Individuals with a belief in competition suggest that competition makes individuals more 
efficient and hard-working, stimulating them to perform to the best of their abilities (McClosky 
& Zaller, 1984). This, according to free market oriented individuals, produces beneficial 
outcomes to society in the form of better products, higher customer satisfaction, and efficient 
utilization of limited resources (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). They argue that fair competition is 
not only beneficial for the organization and society because it maximizes beneficial 




and quality products, but also for the individual engaged in competition via the best use of one’s 
resources (Smith, 2017). The competition indicator of free market orientation emphasizes 
meritocracy in organizations and society overall by suggesting that in meritocratic systems 
everyone has an equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual 
knowledge, ability, and skills (Castilla & Bernard, 2010). Thus, they argue that meritocracy is 
not only beneficial for an organization or society, but also for the individual engaged in 
competition.  
 Cooperation, a polar opposite of competition, refers to the belief that mutual commitment 
and co-operation creates beneficial outcomes for everyone (Triandis, 2018; Schwartz, 2007). 
This may involve inducing individuals to recognize one another as equals who share basic 
interests and goals (Shwartz, 2007). Parties in a transaction are expected to internalize a 
commitment to cooperate and to feel concern for everyone’s welfare (Triandis, 2018). They may 
at times expect themselves and others to act for the benefit of others with equality, justice, and 
mutual interest being of critical significance for these individuals. For them, an optimal outcome 
is achieved when the actors in the economy collaborate to achieve their goals through 
“information sharing, monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation” (Schwartz, 2007: 52). 
Diverging views on competition and cooperation may be observed, for example, in the 
way the U.S. and Germany follow different practices in executive pay (Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007) or the participation of labor unions in organizational decision making (Gospel & 
Pendleton, 2003). Indeed, although firms both in the U.S. and Germany engage in strategic 
alliances or partnerships to a certain extent in order to gain competitive advantage, the U.S., with 
higher support for market-based competition than Germany (Hall, 2001; Kaufmann, 2013) or 




for competitive labor, financial, and product markets with “a sharp separation” between the firm 
and its external partners (Thomas & Waring, 1999:733), whereas Germany relies on mutual 
cooperation among economic actors within a dense network of institutions and shared control 
(Thomas & Waring, 1999). To illustrate, Thomas and Warring (1999) contrasting German 
business from that of the U.S. emphasize that German businesses are “more embedded in 
networks of relations that are more permanent, with a greater and less formal sharing of control 
[across partners]” than their U.S. counterparts, where there is “ a sharp separation between the 
firm and its external transactors”. (:734, 733). 
Final, the third dimension of free market orientation, property rights, refers to an 
individual’s belief in one’s right to own unlimited property and allocate or use it at his or her 
discretion. Free-market-oriented individuals consider private property the most important 
element for personal autonomy and incentivizing competition. This happens because they believe 
the right to own unlimited property incentivizes individuals to work harder as they believe they 
can retain what they earn (Hayek, 1944). This, according to free market oriented individuals, 
increases beneficial outcomes for society (McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Randolph, 2012). The 
intellectual roots of this argument can be traced to the economist Adam Smith, who considered a 
breach of one’s property rights as the next most severe crime to the assault on one’s body (Smith, 
2017).  
Although those who oppose unlimited property rights do not generally argue against 
one’s right to own private property, they seek a balance between property and societal rights 
(Matten & Crane, 2005). They argue that individuals also have societal rights, which are 
comprised of “… those rights that provide the individual with the freedom to participate in 




Crane, 2005: 170). They argue that those rights may prevail over one’s right to private property 
in some cases. Thus, they argue that the benefits of property rights are diminished once they 
infringe on societal rights, i.e. the rights and interests of broader stakeholder groups (Beetham, 
2017).  
Individuals might have differing opinions on the balance between property rights and 
societal rights depending on the country. For example, in American society more than four out 
of five respondents surveyed in the late 2000s agreed that “private property rights are just as 
important as other rights like freedom of speech and religion” (Associated Press, 2008), whereas 
in France, only about one out of ten respondents surveyed regarded “the right to own property, 
either alone or in association with others’ as one of their most valued human rights” 
(YouGov.UK, 2016). Thus, although most capitalist societies generally support property rights, 
the degree of support for unlimited property rights may vary, with the population in the U.S. 
demonstrating higher support for property rights in comparison to the population of France, 
which may ultimately have higher support for societal over property rights. The high regard for 
property rights in the U.S. is especially attributed to a manifestation of “a property owner’s 
individuality” that is closely associated with higher support for economic individualism in the 
U.S. (Friedman, 2001). 
  In summary, the three indicators highlighted above and discussed in detail in the first 
dissertation paper – economic individualism, competition, and property rights – are important 
components of one’s free market orientation and are generally perceived to be stable over time 
(Feldman, 2013). One polar end represents an ideal free market culture, where an individual 
supports strong autonomy or independence of action, competitive behavior, and property rights. 




operation, commitment to each other, and limited or no support for private property rights. These 
three indicators have been argued to be central features of capitalism or free enterprise, 
especially in the United States (see McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Lipset, 1979). Although the 
predominant sample for executive political ideology research is the population of most 
developed capitalist societies with general higher support for economic individualism, 
competition, and property rights (i.e. higher end of the free market orientation scale), divergent 
views on the economic individualism, competition, and property rights among people of these 
countries persists, including CEOs of public corporations (see the first dissertation paper for 
detailed discussion).   In the next section of this paper, I intend to develop and validate a scale to 
measure these three indicators of CEO free market orientation. Thus, while economic 
individualism is defined as the belief that people should get ahead by themselves, be 
autonomous, and be self-reliant, competition refers to the belief that rivalry among parties is a 
means for advancement and economic progress. Finally, property rights, a third integral 
component of an individual’s free market orientation, reflects an individual’s belief in one’s right 
to own unlimited property and allocate it at his or her discretion. 
 
D. Methods 
a. Sample selection 
 I use CATA (content analysis) to measure the relevant indicators of free market 
orientation. Integrating CATA to measure the construct of interest provides numerous 
advantages to organizational researchers. First, it has higher reliability than human coding with 
lower cost and greater speed (Neuendorf & Kumar, 2002). Second, this unobtrusive measure is 




desirability bias (Chin et al., 2013) and a reluctance of CEOs to respond to questions about their 
ideological views as sensitive as political or economic ideology (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). 
Numerous organizational studies have successfully employed content analysis utilizing publicly 
available firm documents such as letters to shareholders, annual reports (e.g., Abrahamson & 
Park, 1994; Bowman, 1984; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991) and, more recently, earnings call 
transcripts (Lee, Hawang, & Chen, 2017; Pan, McNamara, Lee, Haleblian, & Devers, 2017). 
Prior research has supported the usefulness of analyzing these public documents (e.g., letters to 
shareholders, earnings calls) to investigate phenomena such as competitive aggressiveness (Chen 
& Hambrick, 1995; Chen & Macmillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994), competitive actions or 
moves  (Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996), strategic change (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), board chair 
role as a resource provider (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Krause, Semadani, & Withers, 2016), 
board attention (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010), CEO attention (Kaplan, 2008), 
entrepreneurial orientation (Short et al., 2010) and overconfidence (Lee et al., 2017).  
 The Shapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests that the cognitive categories through which 
individuals understand the world are reflected in the words they use (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Sapir 1944; Whorf 1956). “Words that are frequently used are cognitively central and reflect 
what is most on the user’s mind; words that are used infrequently or not at all are at the cognitive 
periphery, perhaps even representing uncomfortable or alien concepts” (Cho & Hambrick, 2006: 
459; Huff 1990). Hence, analysis of CEO spoken words is one of the best ways to observe what 
they value and how they understand the world, i.e. their economic values or free market 
orientation. 
My sample consists of quarterly earnings conference calls of all CEOs from the 




the Execucomp database is comprised of publicly traded firms that allows public access to 
earnings calls as well as the collection of additional variables (i.e., measures of organizational 
size and firm performance) through a secondary source without the threat of introducing 
common method variance.  
Earnings calls led by firm top executives is an opportunity for management to deliver 
their perspective on issues their firms are facing and to influence their stakeholder perceptions 
(Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). Further, the voluntary 
nature of these events allows significant latitude to management “to present information in the 
way they believe” (Pan et al., , 2018: 2206). Generally, there are two distinct sections to earnings 
calls: an introductory portion and a discussion section (Blau, DeLisle, & Price, 2015). Similar to 
other forms of corporate communication, such as press releases, SEC filings, company annual 
reports, the introductory section of quarterly earnings calls are uninterrupted, where managers 
essentially go through the prepared scripted presentation. However, in the second, discussion 
section, management generally may go off the script to reflect their views, such as CEO of 
TESLA telling analysts that “boring, bonehead questions are not cool” (Gillette, 2018). Thus, the 
second discussion section of the calls is a great opportunity to observe a more nuanced view of 
CEO because of spontaneity of the unscripted speech (Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011; 
Price, Doran, Peterson, & Bliss, 2012). 
My selection of CEO quarterly earnings calls with analysts for CATA as an indicator of 
free market orientation is based on two main criteria. First, the indicator needed to be under the 
control of the CEO and not driven primarily by institutional or other external forces to qualify as 
a manifestation of the CEO’s free market orientation (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). In contrast 




constructed or selectively edited by firm management (Blau, DeLisle, & Price, 2015; Matsumoto 
et al., 2011; Price et al., 2012). Thus, CEO participation in earnings calls is less scripted and may 
be a vital source of understanding a CEO’s worldview and values. Second, the use of earnings 
calls ensures comparability among firms and allows me to control for many other potential 
influences on CEOs’ rhetoric in these events. For example, conference calls take place in similar 
settings, have a relatively standardized length, and cover similar topics across firms.  
I use Seeking Alpha, a crowd-sourced web content service for financial markets, to 
obtain transcripts of quarterly earnings conference calls for years 2010 and 2011 following a 
focal individual becoming a CEO. This is consistent with the guidelines of Short et al. (2010) 
who analyzed annual shareholder letters of CEOs to measure CEO entrepreneurial orientation 
but have used only a one-year document. Further, a two-year time frame that includes on average 
eight earnings call transcripts to construct free market orientation measure is consistent with the 
time span of prior research that has used ten consecutive periods of political donations to 
construct political ideology measure (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017a,b; Briscoe et al., 
2014).  
I have identified 444 CEO transitions in years 2008 and 2009 in Execucomp. Out of these 
102 were either acquired, merged with another company or the CEO lost his or her position prior 
to 2010, 48 did not have any earnings calls for the period of 2010 and 2011, and 63 never had 
any earnings calls in SeekingAlpha.com. This has left me with 231 CEOs who have had at least 
one earnings call in years 2010 and 2011. However, to maintain consistency with previous 
research that has utilized ten consecutive periods of political donations to construct political 
ideology measure (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017a,b; Briscoe et al., 2014) and to 




who have had earnings calls covering at least half of the period of 2010 and 2011, which leaves 
me with a final sample of 140 earnings calls. 
 
b. Free Market Orientation Operationalization 
 To construct a valid measure of free market orientation, I rely on my own novel 
definition of free market orientation as the ‘‘belief in the supremacy of individual self-reliance, 
competition, and property rights” presented in the first paper of my dissertation. This definition 
demonstrates multidimensionality of free market orientation with support for economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights being three distinct indicators of the construct. 
Thus, by definition, free market orientation, is a construct that has at least three elements: 
economic individualism, competition, and property rights.  
I have created a discrete and exhaustive word list for each of these theoretically based 
indicators from The Synonym Finder (Rodale, 1978) consistent with Short et al. (2010). More 
specifically, I generated synonyms or words associated with each above-mentioned dimension of 
the construct. I consider it important that word lists used are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, 
that each word that is extracted from the dictionary can be linked with only one indicator of free 
market orientation. This is consistent with recommendations of Short et al. (2010) and past 
studies that have utilized The Synonym Finder (e.g., Hubbard, Pollock, Pfarrer, & Rindova, 
2017) or other relevant thesaurus or dictionary of words associated with a particular construct 
(e.g., Buyl, Boone, & Wade, 2017). Word lists that I generated from The Synonym Finder were 
validated in step 2 using a multistep process with two raters who were unaware of the purpose of 
the study. The raters were third- and fourth-year Ph.D. candidates in management with 




Finder and compared them to the theoretical definition of the three indicators of free market 
orientation presented to them. They were instructed to delete words that did not match the 
specified indicators and add words that could be associated with each dimension of the construct. 
To demonstrate inter-rater reliability of my nominal coding scheme (agree/disagree between the 
raters), I have used Holsti’s (1969) method as recommended by Short et al. (2010) for CATA. 
The Holsti (1969) inter-rater agreement method reflects underlying agreement in coding between 
or among raters and has been widely used by previous research in content analysis (Stemler, 
2001; Milne & Adler, 1999). The Holsti (1969) method uses the following formula: 
 (PA0= 2A/nA+nB),  
where PA0 is the proportion agreement observed between two raters, A is the measure of 
agreements between the two raters, and nA and nB are the overall quantity of words coded by the 
two raters. The inter-rater agreement between two raters as per Holsti’s (1969) methodology for 
deductive procedure comprised 0.84. According to guidelines suggested by Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 
(2005), Krippendorff (2004), and Ellis (1994) values higher than .75 should be considered as a 
sign of high reliability. This deductive process has yielded 108 words pertaining to economic 
individualism, 99 words pertaining to competition, and 49 words pertaining to property rights 
indicators of free market orientation respectively. The full list of words generated at this step is 
presented in Table 1. 
In step 3, I supplemented my deductive analysis with an inductive procedure based on the 
word choices evident in CEO earnings calls. First, I identified a comprehensive list of commonly 
used words from my sample of transcripts of CEO earnings calls. Similar to others who have 




Doucet & Jehn, 1997; Short et al., 2010), I generated an exhaustive list of frequently used words 
within all texts of the CEO earnings call transcripts across my sample.   
Second, I looked for a general definition/explanation of free market orientation that could 
guide my inductive reasoning and selected words that aligned with a general 
definition/explanation of free market orientation. In the third step, the two raters also examined 
the lists to identify words associated with each indicator of free market orientation, deleting the 
words that they considered irrelevant. The inter-rater agreement between two raters as per the 
methodology by Holsti (1969) is 0.78, which is also a sign of high inter-rater reliability 
according to Ellis (1994). The list was refined by a discussion of potential words identified by 
one but not both raters through an iterative process until both raters agreed that a particular word 
either should be included into one of the indicators of free market orientation or discarded. This 
inductive procedure of dictionary generation yielded 54 words pertaining to economic 
individualism, 68 words pertaining to competition, and 59 words pertaining to property rights 
indicators of free market orientation. The full list of words identified through this procedure is 
also presented in Table 1. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------------------------------- 
In step 4, I summed the number of words utilized by each quarterly earnings call as per 
the dictionary of the words that have been combined via the deductive and inductive approaches 
highlighted above (step 2 and 3). I also calculated a total number of words spoken by the CEO in 
each quarterly earnings call. The measure of each indicator of free market orientation (i.e. 




number of words relevant to each indicator to total number of words in each quarterly earnings 
call. The overall number of quarterly earning calls for two years were averaged to obtain free 
market orientation measure. For example, if 120 words out of 1200 are identified as relevant to 
economic individualism indicator of free market orientation through the analysis of the word 
frequency in Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 earnings calls from Year 1, to calculate economic 
individualism measure for a specific quarterly earnings call, 120 were divided by 1200 to get 0.1 
as the measure of economic individualism. If the measure of economic individualism for Year 1 
and 2 are 0.12 and 0.2 respectively, the overall two-year or eight quarter measure of economic 
individualism for a focal CEO is 0.16. This methodology is consistent with Chin et al. (2013), 
Gupta et al. (2017a, b) and other research that has used 10 periods of donation to obtain political 
ideology measure. 
In step 5, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to observe whether the three 
indicators of free market orientation (i.e. economic individualism, competition, and property 
rights) are loading on to the same factor. All three indicators of free market orientation are 
highly correlated and loaded on one factor with eigenvalue of 2.5, producing the relevant 
statistical criteria to satisfy this condition. Specifically, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that to 
have an overall model fit: RMSEA should be lower than .06, and TLI and CFI higher than .90 
respectively. My factor analysis demonstrated RMSEA value is 0.00, that the CFI value is 1.00 
and that the TLI value is 1.00, suggesting overall model fit. Reliability of the measure as 
measured by Cronbach alpha is 0.88. Full results of the factor analysis as well as correlation 







Insert Table 2 and 3 here 
--------------------------------------- 
E. Robustness check 
 In the next step, I assessed the robustness of my free market orientation 
measure via CATA. I used archival data on the individual political donation record of CEOs to 
construct an alternate measure of free market orientation based on an individual’s support of 
free-market-oriented congressional members. Prior research has found that an individual’s 
donation data or campaign contributions are valid indicators of one’s political ideology or views 
(Chin et al., 2013). While a broader measure of CEO liberalism-conservatism differentiates 
between the degree of donor support between Republican and Democratic parties through their 
political donation data (Chin et al., 2013), it does not account for differences of both parties, 
where support for free market ideals may not necessarily indicate support for conservative ideals 
(Miller & Schofield, 2008). However, by examining Congressional member support for free 
market-friendly policies through their actual votes, I should be able to tap the free market 
orientation of CEOs who donate to these individuals.  For this purpose, I used data from the 
CATO Institute, a libertarian think tank that tracks all Congressional member votes on their 
degree of opposition to free trade and subsidies.   
 More specifically, the CATO Institute tracks how Congress and its individual 
members have voted over the years 1999-2014 on bills and amendments affecting trade barriers 
to the U.S. economy and subsidies that certain sectors of the economy receive. The data is 
publicly available on the CATO Institute website. According to the CATO Institute, the choice 




market and government intervention, which demonstrates whether U.S. policy favors a free 
market by advancing free trade and rejecting government intervention such as export and 
agricultural subsidies, or whether it favors intervention by not only maintaining and raising 
barriers to trade but also various subsidies. Through their votes on legislation, members of 
Congress can oppose both trade barriers and trade subsidies, oppose barriers and favor subsidies, 
favor barriers and oppose subsidies, or favor both barriers and subsidies. Thus, by considering 
the CATO Institute Congressional voting record, I may observe a more accurate and useful way 
of measuring how individual members of Congress vote on free market issues, classifying 
members of Congress according to their degree of support for an international market free from 
the distorting effects of barriers and subsidies. 
Free-market-oriented individuals argue that both kinds of intervention—barriers and 
subsidies—direct resources to less-efficient uses, substituting the judgment of government 
officials for that of private actors in the marketplace and limiting competition and efficient 
functioning of a free market. Thus, combining trade barriers and trade subsidies as measures of 
free trade creates a reliable measure for evaluating public policy toward the free market 
principles of Congressional members. Free market oriented members of Congress are likely to 
consistently vote against both trade barriers and economic subsidies, whereby those who oppose 
free market principles support them. For example, in CATO data, a well-known Republican free 
marketer, Rand Paul has a score of 88% on opposing free trade barriers and 100% of opposing to 
subsidies, whereas a fellow Republican, Jeff Sessions, has merely scored 54% and 45% 
respectively. To compare, another renowned egalitarian senator, Bernie Sanders, has a score of 
8% and 20% on opposition to trade barriers and subsidies, meaning that 92% of the time he 




Prior research has widely used donation data as an indicator of an individual’s ideology 
(e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Gupta & Wowak, 2017, Chin & Semadani, 2017). Accordingly, I 
measured each CEO’s free market orientation by examining the degree to which he or she 
supported the free-market-oriented congressional members using data on individual political 
contributions to the members of Congress between years 1997-2007 and 1998-2008, 
respectively. However, because the data is available only to the members of Congress with a 
voting record but not losing political candidates, for the purposes of a robustness check, I 
included only CEOs that have donated to sitting members of Congress for years 1997-2007 and 
1998-2008.  
Using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, consistent with Chin et al. (2013) I 
coded executives’ contribution records for the 10 years prior to their becoming CEOs (1997-
2007 or 1998-2008). This window is wide enough, encompassing five congressional election 
cycles and two presidential elections, to allow meaningful interpretation of an executive’s 
donation pattern. As described below, my CATO based measure of free market orientation is 
assessed by examining the executives’ political donations to Congressional members between 
1997 and 2007 or 1998 and 2008 for the ten years before they became CEOs (from year t–10 to 
t–1, where t is the first year of their CEO position). To illustrate, the time frame for considering 
the donation records of CEOs appointed in 2008 will be from 1997 to 2007. Moreover, by 
focusing only on political donations made before CEOs began their tenures, and by omitting 
CEOs who had previously been CEOs, I reduce the possibility that CEOs’ donation patterns 
might be reflections of their interests on behalf of their firms rather than of their personal values 




Political contributions data, consistent with previous research (Chin et al., 2013; Chin & 
Semadani, 2017), originated from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the independent 
regulatory agency established to monitor and disclose campaign finance information. The FEC 
records all individual contributions of more than $200 to individual candidates; to campaign 
committees for federal office; to national, state, and local parties; and to political action 
committees (PACs). Since 1993, such data have been accessible directly from the FEC website, 
as well as from non-partisan research institutes such as the Center for Responsive Politics 
(www.opensecrets.org).  
I summed total votes in opposition to trade barriers and subsidies of an individual 
Congressional member and divide by the overall number of votes a particular Congressional 
member had on free trade and subsidy related issues to consider free market orientation of CEOs. 
For example, if Congressional member A (either a Senator or Congressmen/Congresswoman) 
voted 10 times in opposition to trade barriers out of overall 20 votes related to free trade and 
voted 5 times in opposition on subsidies out of overall 10 votes on issues that promote subsidies, 
the overall measure of free market orientation of a Congressional member is (10+5)/ (20+10) 
=.50. The average score of free market orientation of all Congressional members a focal CEO 
supported in the ten-year period prior to becoming a CEO comprises his or her free market 
orientation measure. Only 47 CEOs from my initial sample of 140 CEOs for which content 
analysis was conducted have been involved in political donations. Descriptive statistics 
(correlations, means, and standard deviation) of the relationship between CATO based measure 
and indicators of free market orientation based on CATA is presented in Table 3. The results 
suggest that CATA based indicators of free market orientation are in fact negatively correlated 




unexpected finding since CATO based measure should be a robustness check of my CATA 
based measure of free market orientation with the expectation of a positive correlation between 
these two variables. This unexpected finding is further discussed in the discussion section of the 
paper. 
To establish the distinctiveness of the CATA based measure of free market orientation 
from the traditional scale of CEO liberalism-conservatism, I used information on CEOs’ overall 
contributions to Democratic and Republican Party candidates and organizations. Consistent with 
Chin et al.(2013), I calculated four indicators, each of which taps a distinct facet of political 
giving, which together becomes my political liberalism index: (1) the number of donations to 
Democrats divided by the number of donations to recipients of both parties (to handle zero 
values, I added .1 to all numerators and .2 to all denominators), (2) the dollar amount of 
donations to Democrats divided by the amount of donations to both parties, (3) the number of 
years (over the 10-year time frame) the executive made donations to Democrats divided by the 
number of years donations were made to either party, and (4) the number of distinct Democratic 
recipients to which the executive made donations divided by the total number of distinct 
recipients of both parties. For these calculations, I included contributions to individual 
candidates, party committees, and any PACs identified as containing either Democratic or 
Republican supporters consistent with the Chin et al. (2013) methodology. I calculated the 
political liberalism index scores as the simple average of the four items consistent with Chin et 
al. (2013) for the whole sample. The results presented in Table 4 suggest moderate to little 
correlation between CATA based free market orientation and liberalism-conservatism measure 
as per Chin et al. (2013). The correlation between liberalism and free market orientation measure 




free market orientation is not necessarily related to support of either Republican or Democratic 
candidates, which is consistent with the idea that free market oriented individuals might be 
attracted to either party because of their social values.  
--------------------------------------- 




Free market orientation reflects executives’ economic values and is demonstrated in the 
way executives run their organizations. Three distinct indicators of executives’ free market 
orientation are economic individualism, competition, and property rights. In this paper, I have 
attempted to operationalize executive economic values or free market orientation through a CATA 
technique that has been suggested to be a valid methodology to capture a phenomenon of interest 
when the use of obtrusive measures is impossible or not a preferred choice (Short et al., 2010). I 
also constructed a robustness check for this novel measure utilizing executive support of free 
market oriented Congressional members through campaign contributions. In addition to this, I 
sought to demonstrate the distinctiveness of this new measure from traditional liberalism-
conservatism measure as constructed by Chin et al. (2013) through proxying political donations of 
executives to Republican and Democratic candidates. 
The results of CATA and factor analysis demonstrated that three indicators of free market 
orientation are highly correlated and load into one factor. However, my robustness check did not 
achieve expected results with a small but negative correlation between CATA and CATO based 
measure of free market orientation. Nevertheless, the CATA based measure of free market 




conservatism, while CATO based measure and traditional liberalism-conservatism measure were 
highly negatively correlated. 
These results suggest that while donation-based measures are associated with each other in 
a meaningful way (CATO free market orientation and traditional liberalism-conservatism 
measure), they do not necessarily tap into an individual’s economic values that are increasingly 
argued to be a distinct dimension of individual’s political ideology (Malka et al., 2017). Indeed, a 
small positive, but insignificant correlation between CATA based measure of free market 
orientation and traditional liberalism-conservatism measure suggests that these two measures are 
distinct and traditional liberalism-conservatism measure may not necessarily tap into economic 
values of executives. 
Beyond demonstrating limitations of traditional liberalism-conservatism measure to 
capture executives’ economic values, this novel CATA based measure uncovers a new avenue of 
research to examine the economic worldview of executives in upper echelons research. More 
specifically, this novel measure provides a more nuanced understanding of organizational 
outcomes associated with diverging economic philosophies in terms of the underlying role of 
corporations in society, such as supremacy of shareholder interests, extent of CEO tolerance for 
organizational interdependence and desirability of fierce competition in the marketplace. Thus, 
important organizational outcomes, such as a firm involvement in CSR (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta 
et al., 2017a), mergers and acquisitions (Elnahas & Kim, 2017), tax avoidance (Francis et al., 2017) 
or fiscal conservatism (Hutton et al, 2014) may be closely examined through the prism of 
executives’ economic values, which has largely been overlooked in management.  
Interestingly, the findings of this paper raise more questions that warrant further 




upper echelons research towards more precise measures.  As suggested earlier, while I did not find 
theorized positive correlation between CATA and CATO based measures of free market 
orientation, a significant negative correlation between CATO based measure of free market 
orientation and a traditional liberalism-conservatism measure was found. One explanation for 
these findings could be that political donation-based measures do not necessarily represent 
economic views of executives. This may be true because executives support Congressional 
members largely for their social and not economic values.  
An alternative explanation for these findings may be that executives donate because of 
instrumental reasons rather than their individual social and economic values. In fact, scholars in 
political science argue that businesses often donate across the aisle and may not necessarily donate 
based on their managers’ individual values (Snyder, 1990; Claassen, 2007; Barber, 2016). Indeed, 
president Trump is often quoted saying that he used to donate across the aisle both to Democrats 
and Republicans solely to advance his business interests. This is also consistent with some of the 
findings of Chin and his colleagues (2013) that even CEOs of industries, such as oil and gas, that 
theoretically should support the Republican Party because of laxer support for regulation of these 
industries donate to other side of the aisle, which may also suggest some instrumental reasons for 
political donations by executives. To corroborate this point further, my examination of the sample 
of executive political donations has shown that frequency of political donations largely increases 
as a focal executive gets closer to higher echelons in his or her career while non-instrumentality of 
executive political donations would suggest that frequency should remain stable over time. While 
this research is the first step to advance an alternate measure to examine executive economic values 
beyond a traditional liberalism-conservatism score, future research may shed light on these 




Because this research has focused on executive transitions in 2008 and 2009 only, only the 
third of the initial sample were found to engage in campaign contributions – a necessary condition 
to construct measures of CATO free market orientation as well as traditional liberalism-
conservatism measure. This has limited the sample of executives with full observations for CATA, 
CATO, and donation-based liberalism measure. Thus, given that small sample size influence 
statistical power of correlations (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009), future studies may conduct this 
study on a larger sample of executive successions or capture CEO transitions in multiple years to 
corroborate findings of this study.  
Finally, while the use of CATA techniques and validation methods to capture a construct 
utilized in this paper has been used in previous research, the use of alternate validation techniques 
to further validate this novel measure is likely to be a significant next step to advance the wider 
use of this measure. One alternate option is comparing the CATA based measure of free market 
orientation of politicians whose economic values have been publicly declared. For example, a 
socialist Democrat, Bernie Sanders should have a lower CATA based free market orientation score 
than the libertarian Rand Paul, who is known to widely promote free market ideals. Alternatively, 
a survey of a certain number of executives may be conducted to compare it to their CATA based 
free market orientation measure. Future research may explore this or alternate techniques to further 
validate this novel measure that may become an important measure to capture executive economic 
philosophies.   
 
G. Conclusion  
 
This paper sought to advance a novel methodology to measure executive free market 




property rights. Utilizing earnings conference calls of 140 CEOs who transitioned to their 
positions in 2008 and 2009, respectively, a CATA based measure of free market orientation has 
been developed and contrasted with a traditional liberalism-conservatism measure. Future research 
in upper echelons may benefit from testing the impact of executive free market orientation on 
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Table 1.  Free market orientation indicators CATA dictionary developed as per Short et 












ability, accountability, accountable, assertive, assured, 
at-liberty, authority, authorization, autonomous, 
autonomy, believe, bet, capability, capable, 
certain, command, competence, competency, 
conduct, confident, control, convinced, dare, 
daring, decontrol, dependable, deregulation, 
deserve, direct, discipline, distinct, duty, earn, 
effective, effectively, effectiveness, efficacy, 
enable, endure, endurance, energetic, 
entrepreneur, entrepreneurial, excellence, 
experience, expertise, explore, fail, failure, goal-
oriented, hardworking, headstrong, impact, 
impacts, independence, independent, individual, 
intelligence, investigate, investigation, justified, 
knowledge, lead, leads, leader, liability, liable, 
liberty, manage, mastery, merit, meritocracy, 
obligated, obligation, oversee, pioneer, potential, 
power, prevail, proficiency, protect, qualified, 
resolute, resources, responsibility, responsible, 
restrain, risk, risky, satisfied, secure, self-reliant, 
self-sufficiency, skill, skillfulness, solvent, 
strength, strengthen , succeed, supervise, sure, 




able, acquisition, acquisitions, actions, answer, 
anticipate, asset, assets, capabilities, capacity, 
cash, certainly, clearly, credit, debt, decision, 
efforts, enterprise, execution, expect, expected, 
fact, goal, hard, initiatives, job, know, 
leadership, loans, order, proactive, provide, 
providing, quality, real, reliability, reliable, 
reserves, security, seeking, separate, solid, 
solutions, strong, stronger, success, successful, 















Achieve, achievement, advance, advantage, aggressive, 
ambitious,  assault, assert,  attack, battle, beat, 
bid, capitalize, challenge, challenger, clash, 
combat, compare, compared, compete, 
competing, competition, competitive, 
competitor, competitory, conflict, conflicting, 
confront, contend, contender, contest, cutthroat, 
defeat, defend, drive, driving, eager, earnest, 
encounter, enemy, engage, engagement, 
enthusiastic, entrant, exploit, exploitative, fall, 
fell, fervent, fervid, fierce, fight, fighter, foe, 
forceful, forward, game, grow, hostilities, 
improve, increase, infighting, intense, 
intensified, intensive, leverage, lose, match, 
offensive, opponent, oppose, opposing, 
opposition, overcome, predatory, pretentious, 
promote, promotion, pushing, race, reach, 
relative, rise, rival, rivalry, scuffle, seize, 
strategy, strive, striving, struggle, supply, target,  
threat, tournament, vigorous, vying, war, win    
Inductive  
procedure 
above, against, ahead, back, base, before, better, beyond, 
challenged, challenges, challenging, changes, , 
competitiveness, competitors, deal, deals, 
demand, environment, expand, expanding, 
expansion, focus, focused, greater, grew, 
growing, growth, higher, improved, 
improvement, improving, increased, increases, 
increasing, last, launch, launched, less, loss, 
losses, lower, market, market's, marketplace, 
markets, momentum, more, most, opportunities, 
opportunity, over, period, position, positioned, 
price, prices, pricing, prior, project, projects, 










Table 1 (Cont.) 
Property rights Deductive  
procedure 
bank, banker, benefit, benefits, bondholder, bonds, 
bonus, capital, compensation, dividend, earnings, 
finances, financier, fortune, funds, gain, gains, 
income, interest, investiture, investment, 
investments, investor, lender, own, owner, 
ownership, payoff, possess, possession, 
possessions, possessor, principal, proceeds, 
profit, profits, property, proprietor, 
reimbursement, remuneration, shareholder, 
shareholders, shareowner, stimulus, stock, 
stockholder, trademark, wealth, yield 
Inductive  
procedure 
amount, billion, board, contract, contracts, cost, costs, 
deliver, dollars, efficiencies, efficiency, equity, 
expense, expenses, financial, future, invest, 
invested, investing, investor-owned, investors, 
long-term, margin, margins, million, money, 
number, numbers, performance, portfolio, prior, 
product, production, productivity, products, 
profit, profitability, profitable, profits, 
proprietary, proprietoship, proprietress, quarter, 
quarters, result, results, retain, return, returns, 
revenue, revenues, savings, securities, share, 













Results of factor analysis involving three indicators of free market orientation: economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights. 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs    =        140 
    Method: principal-component factors          Retained factors =          1 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                        Number of params =          3 
 
 Factor    Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1       2.592     2.372     0.864     0.864 
Factor2       0.221     0.034     0.073     0.938 
Factor3       0.187      0.062     1.000 
 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  308.94 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
 Variable   Factor1  Uniqueness 
competition      0.933     0.130 
Economic individualism     0.933     0.130 




 Factor    Variance  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1       2.592 .     0.864     0.864 
 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  308.94 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 










Table 3. Correlation between CATO measure of free market support and  
indicators of free market orientation based on CATA 
 
    Mean S.D
. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 Free market (CATO) 0.51 0.1
5 
1.00         






      






    























Table 4. Correlation between CEO liberalism and indicators of free market  
orientation based on CATA 
 
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 Liberalism 0.37 0.32 1.00         
2 Free market orientation (CATA) -0.02 0.99 0.09 1.00       
3 Economic individualism 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.93 1.00     
4 Competition 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.94 0.82 1.00   





Table 5. Correlation between CATO measure of free market orientation and traditional 
liberalism score 
 
    Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Free market orientation (CATO) 0.5 0.1 1.0           
2 Liberalism 0.4 0.3 -0.5 1.0         
3 number of donations 0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.9 1.0       
4 dollar amount of donations 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.9 0.9 1.0     
5 number of years 0.5 0.4 -0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.0   
6 distinct  recepients 0.4 0.3 -0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 
 





IV. Chapter III: “Because I Care, I risk”: How CEO Free Market Orientation affects the 




As an initial demonstration of the significance of CEOs’ economic values, a distinct and 
independent dimension of executive political ideology, I develop and test the idea that CEOs’ 
free market orientation will influence their firms’ extent and type of income smoothing 
strategies, defined as an attempt on the part of the firm's management to actively manage 
earnings toward a predetermined target. Specifically, I argue that free market oriented CEOs are 
more likely to engage in income smoothing and choose income smoothing strategies with the 
least harm to shareholder value but of more risk to themselves – discretionary accounting 
accruals. Thus, by engaging in income smoothing and choosing among certain earnings 
management strategies (real activities, accretive stock repurchases, or discretionary accounting 
accruals), free market-oriented CEOs not only display their ability to take greater risks but also 














The notion that executives differ in their worldview is a central assumption of upper 
echelons theory, which considers individual beliefs, values, and preferences (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007) as predictors of organizational outcomes (for a review, see 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Bromiley & Rau, 2016). According to this view, 
CEOs interpret and act on their environments not merely as rational, self-interested agents, but as 
social actors whose motives stem from their values and beliefs (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The 
emerging research on executives’ political ideology, a natural extension from upper echelons 
research, emphasizes that the ideological divide among executives – Republican vs. Democratic 
Party leaning in the U.S., a proxy for the conservatism-liberalism political ideology construct – 
affects how executives filter information, make decisions, and run their organizations (e.g., Chin, 
Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; Chin & Semadani, 2017; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 
2015). However, this broad conceptualization of political ideology fails to shed light on some 
intriguing organizational outcomes associated with Republican- and Democratic-leaning 
executives.  
To illustrate, while this research stream considers Republican-leaning executives as risk-
averse individuals (Christensen et al., 2015) with a higher need for security and status quo 
(Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014) and intolerance for change (Chin et al., 2013), emerging 
research suggests that Republican-leaning executives not only display a behavior inconsistent 
with these traits, such as greater tax sheltering (Francis, Hasan, Sun & Wu, 2016), corporate 
wrongdoings (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015), and actions attempted to change their 
environment (Unsal, Hassan, & Zirek, 2016), but also were found to deliver overall better 




Jiang, & Kumar, 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017). Relatedly, while this conceptualization portrays 
Democratic-leaning executives as caring about the natural environment, social issues, and justice 
(Briscoe et al., 2014), they were found to engage in more securities and intellectual property 
rights litigations (Hutton et al., 2015), be less prudent with shareholder or investor funds 
(DeVault & Sias, 2017), and issue financial reports of lower quality than their Republican 
counterparts (Bhandari, Golden, & Thevenot, 2018). 
These findings are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of the liberalism-
conservatism political ideology construct. Specifically, by predominantly focusing on the 
psychological needs that are known to predict an individual’s views on social issues (Jost, 
Glacer, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Fedlman & Johston, 2014), this political ideology 
construct conflates social and economic values. Thus, critical questions such as whether a 
corporation engages in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta, 
Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2017), mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Elnahas & Kimn, 2017), tax 
avoidance (Christensen et al., 2015), tax sheltering (Francis et al., 2016) or debt financing and 
investments (Hutton et al., 2014) have been limited largely to either managerial intolerance of 
ambiguity and uncertainty (e.g. Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 
2017) or  aversion to social change and diversity (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014). 
Economic values, however, are increasingly known to be an independent and salient part 
of an individual’s political ideology (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Malka, Lelkes, & 
Soto, 2017). These values, which I refer to as free market orientation, epitomize a range of 
values and beliefs on the supremacy of an individual’s autonomy, competition, and private 
property and reflect the set of widely shared beliefs about the advantage of market mechanisms 




of an individual’s free market orientation are the three core values directly relevant to an 
individual’s economic values: economic individualism, competition, and property rights 
(McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Although one certainly might list additional characteristics, the three 
principles highlighted above (economic individualism, competition, and property rights) define 
important components of a free market orientation continuum. At one polar end is the support for 
an ideal-typical free-market culture where executives support virtually all of these principles 
with abnormal profits, price gouging, and competition considered perfectly legitimate, such as 
when a CEO claims that one has a “moral requirement to sell the product at the highest price” as 
long as there is demand to reward shareholders (Drash, 2018). According to this perspective, 
firms can earn abnormal profits by erecting barriers to entry that restrict competitive forces or 
taking advantage of a short-term disequilibrium in the market (Jacobson, 1992). The opposite 
pole is defined by a set of ideal-typical egalitarian economic values, where cooperation rather 
competition is emphasized (Thomas & Waring, 1999) and shareholders are considered one of 
many stakeholders whose interests need to be respected and accounted for (Freeman, Wicks, & 
Parmar, 2004), such as when a CEO says that “nobody’s going to remember you for delivering 
earnings to stockholders, … [but] will remember you for the lasting impact you made on society” 
(Maloney, 2018). The extreme view of this perspective argues that competition is destructive, 
and cooperation benefits all stakeholders involved (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). 
While evidence of economic values and beliefs on the way individuals run governments 
have been of scholarly concern for some time among economists and political science scholars 
(Pitlik, 2007; Duso & Seldeslachts, 2010; Potrafke, 2010; 2011; Milner & Judkins, 2004; 
Hyytinen, Lundberg & Toivanen, 2008, Osterloh & Debus, 2012; Weymouth & Broz, 2013), the 




organizational strategy and structure remains largely overlooked (See the first dissertation paper 
for detailed discussion of economic values).  
As an initial demonstration of the significance of CEOs’ economic ideology, I develop 
and test the idea that CEOs’ economic values or free market orientation, will influence their 
firms’ extent and means of engagement in income smoothing. The concept of income smoothing, 
an attempt on the part of the firm's management to actively manage earnings toward a 
predetermined target specifically to protect a firm’s value from large market swings that may 
occur based on a very small earnings miss (Chong, 2006; Graham et al., 2005), is central in the 
important debate about the ultimate responsibility of business organizations, particularly about 
the primacy of shareholder interests versus other stakeholders (Post, 2003; Freeman et al., 2004). 
Firms engage in income smoothing to manage external impressions of the firm to build firm 
credibility (Davidson, Jiraport, Kim, & Nemec, 2004) and ultimately increase firm market value 
(Graham et al., 2005). The literature on income smoothing demonstrates that firms can achieve 
income smoothing via three means: real activities (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2011), 
accretive stock repurchases (e.g., Hribar, Jenskins, & Johnson, 2006; Farrel, Yu, & Zhang, 
2014), and discretionary accounting accrual management (e.g., Davidson et al., 2004; Hadani, 
Goranova, & Khan, 2011). While at times understood as a fraudulent or unethical activity, in 
fact, income smoothing is argued to be “not necessarily” illegal or “a negative phenomenon,” but 
“a necessary and logical result of the [discretionary] flexibility [of firm management in 
operational and financial reporting]” (Chong, 2006: 43) and is widely practiced among firms 
(Bitner & Dolan, 1998; Graham et al., 2005). 
Income smoothing is particularly relevant to observe the free market orientation of CEOs 




for the benefit of the owners of the firm. Specifically, because when engaging in income 
smoothing “the line between legitimacy and outright fraud is relatively vague,” external audience 
at times, may have difficulty “distinguishing between what constitutes a good practice and what 
a gray area is,” imposing steep personal and organizational penalties for practices that a CEO 
may otherwise deem legitimate (Chong, 2006: 43). This is also salient to view CEO attitudes 
towards competition and dependence in the marketplace (McClosky & Zaller, 1984) since 
income smoothing strategies also diverge in their impact on future firm capabilities and external 
dependence (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
By testing the impact of the free market orientation of CEOs on firm income smoothing 
strategies, I extend a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between economic values 
and risk-seeking behavior of executives. Specifically, I argue that free market oriented CEOs are 
more likely to pursue income smoothing strategies, which is overall risky both for them and their 
firms. However, they are likely to choose an income smoothing strategy that has a greater 
personal risk  but is of more benefit to owners of the firm.  By this, I extend a more nuanced 
understanding of the extent of risk tolerance among free market oriented CEOs, moving away 
from a risk-averse portrayal of these CEOs.  
This is important because the extant conceptualization of political ideology portrays free 
market oriented executives as driven by psychological needs for certainty and risk aversion (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017). However, support of free 
market principles in fact demonstrates a favorable view of risk taking (Greenberg & Jonas, 
2003). By testing the risk tolerance of free market oriented executives, I contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of the differences in social and economic values in the upper echelons of 




measures of executive ideological beliefs and values. Further, this research advances an 
intriguing possibility that free market oriented CEOs are willing to engage in extra risk in 
consideration of a long-term shareholder benefit. To test my ideas, I develop a content-analysis 
based measure of free market orientation of CEOs, using company quarterly earnings conference 
calls of CEOs of major U.S. companies for years 2010 and 2011.  I examine the association 
between this measure of CEO free market orientation and the extent and type of the firm’s 
income smoothing strategies for years 2012-2016. 
 
C. Literature Review 
 Since Hambrick & Mason’s (1984) seminal paper on upper echelons values and beliefs as 
predictors of organizational actions, a considerable research stream has evolved examining how 
executives’ experiences, personalities, and values influence their behavior (for a review, see 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Bromiley & Rau, 2016). While early studies have 
focused on more observable executive characteristics, such as executive age, education, or 
experience, as predictors of managerial behavior (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2004), more recent 
research explores characteristics that are not so readily or easily observable (e.g., Ou, Tsui, 
Kinicki, Waldman, Xiao, & Song, 2014; Colbert, Barrick, & Bradley, 2014), with political 
ideology being one of the more recent areas under examination (e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Gupta & 
Wowak, 2017; Chin et al., 2017).  
The success of political ideology research in upper echelons research, particularly, rests 
on the fact that it is treated as a unidimensional construct along the right and left spectrum (Jost, 
Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Jost, 2017). The unidimensional nature of political ideology has gained 




and right on the spectrum of political issues since the French revolution (Jost et al., 2008). 
Particularly, in the U.S. two-party system, the Republican Party reflects respect for traditions, 
religion, and inequality, representing conservatism (Bonanno & Jost 2006; Poole & Rosenthal, 
2007). In contrast, the Democratic Party with its tolerance for social change and advocating for 
more equal distribution of wealth represents contemporary liberalism (Bonanno & Jost 2006). 
This parsimonious division into two ideological opposites as well as public availability of 
individuals’ donation data to these parties has led to increased research on political ideology to 
explore organizational outcomes of this division among finance analysts (Jiang et al., 2016); 
hedge and mutual fund managers (DeVault & Sias, 2016; Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012), TMT 
(Hutton et al., 2014), and CEOs (e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017 a, b).  
The current broad conceptualization of political ideology, however, overemphasizes 
psychological needs (see Jost et al., 2003), conflating social and economic values that are 
increasingly considered to be distinct dimensions of political ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 
2014; Noel, 2014). In so doing, it overlooks the salient role of executive economic values and 
beliefs in executive choices (for a review, see the first dissertation paper), merely acknowledging 
economic values as the demonstration of the degree of support for the status quo (Jost et al., 
2003). Specifically, according to this conceptualization, conservatives (Republicans) support free 
markets and capitalism because of their psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and maintain 
the status quo, whereas liberals (Democrats) may not have those needs, thus displaying lesser 
support for free market principles (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003).  
Interestingly, in favoring free market principles (Jackson et al., 2003; Koger et al., 2010), 
conservatives (Republican executives) may seem to encourage uncertainties, change and risk-




stability that reduces uncertainty and anxiety with change (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). This is in 
direct contrast to conformant and risk-averse depiction of supporters of a free market 
conceptualized in the broad liberalism-conservatism construct of political ideology (see Jost et 
al., 2003). As such, economic values are increasingly understood to be an independent and 
salient part of an individual’s political ideology (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht & Lelkes, 2014; Malka, 
Lelkes & Soto, 2017). 
Important components of a free market oriented individual’s economic values are the 
belief in the right to own private property, the right to profit maximization, the premise that 
meritocracy should govern the distribution of income, the superior efficiency of competition, and 
the premise that allowing some to earn unlimited profit advances economic growth by erecting 
barriers to entry that restrict competitive forces or taking advantage of a short-term 
disequilibrium in the market (Jacobson, 1992). The argument is advanced that free market 
principles, such as competition and the desire for profit allow for the creation of attractive 
products and market equilibrium and efficiency in the long-run (Hill, 1990). Political scientists 
define these set of beliefs as an individual’s trust in capitalism (McClosky & Zaller,1984), while 
political psychologists primarily have understood these attributes as economic (e.g. Bakker, 
2017; Crowson, 2009; Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Fleishman, 1988; Malka et al., 2017) or market 
conservatism or liberalism (Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008). Important institutional outcomes of 
these premises are the view that government should stay out of private markets as much as 
possible and the belief that market mechanisms or supply and demand should guide the 
functioning of the economic system (Free & Cantril, 1967). A unifying theme across these values 
or beliefs is the supremacy of market mechanisms over third party or government intervention 




D. Free Market Orientation and Income Smoothing 
While firms can meet their targets without a deliberate attempt to manage their earnings, 
income smoothing is an effort “to counter the cyclical nature” of business operations and 
reported earnings (Beidleman, 1973: 654). Income smoothing has long been considered critical 
for companies to manage their favorable external image (Davidson, Jiraport, Kim, & Nemec, 
2004). This happens because in modern corporations, ownership is typically separated from 
control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, investors, creditors, and other external parties rely on 
the information provided by the firms’ management, and in particular on firms meeting a 
predetermined target (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Chong, 2006).  
According to Chong (2006), income smoothing “is not necessarily illegitimate or a 
negative phenomenon” (43). It is a logical result of flexibility in discretionary operational and 
financial reporting. In fact, legitimate income smoothing occurs when a firm delivers a stable 
performance by making favorable business decisions within the legal discretion of the 
management. That is why, in a survey of executives, Graham et al. (2005) finds that income 
smoothing is commonly practiced by business executives. In many situations, however, CEOs, 
by making a certain operational or reporting decision (i.e. smoothing income), engage in risk 
because the line between legitimate and illegitimate income smoothing can be so close that “at 
times, it becomes difficult for the [outsiders] to distinguish between what constitutes a good 
practice and what a gray area is,” potentially leading to steep personal and organizational 
penalties for such actions (Chong, 2006:43).  
I suggest that there are several reasons why free market oriented CEOs wish to engage in 
more income smoothing than their counterparts even though it involves taking personal and 




stakeholder groups (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), free market oriented CEOs consider 
themselves accountable primarily to current shareholders of their firm as the owners of the firm 
(Thomas & Waring, 1999). They believe that protecting private property rights and returns from 
this property is an essential duty of CEOs as leaders of their organizations (Friedman, 2007). For 
example, Hutton et al. (2015) found that firms with Republican-leaning management engage in 
more civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation, which he and his colleagues argued is 
because of Republican-leaning managers’ views on property rights. Francis et al. (2016) 
similarly found that Republican CEOs, who are more free market oriented, are more likely to 
engage in tax sheltering than Democratic CEOs, which has also been argued as evidence of their 
greater concern with private property rights.  
The importance of smooth earnings for free market oriented CEOs could be attributed to 
empirical evidence showing that investors reward firms with earnings that meet or beat their 
earning target estimates by assigning a valuation premium and penalize those that fall short of 
such estimates (Barth, Elliott, & Finn, 1999; Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Kasznik & 
McNichols, 2002). Meeting or beating a forecast benchmark has been found to increase a firm’s 
stock price (Badertscher, 2011). For example, Chevis, Das, and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) find 
that the valuation premium awarded by the market to firms with smooth earnings increases as the 
length of the period of continuous meet/beat activity increases. They also present evidence 
suggesting that these firms enjoy higher valuations of income and book value of equity than 
firms that only periodically meet or exceed earning targets. Similarly, Bartov et al. (2002) find 
that firms, which meet or beat earnings targets demonstrate higher stock return than firms that 
are not able to meet their earnings targets. In the same vein, Skinner and Sloan (2001), for 




Specifically, the penalty for not meeting earnings targets by one cent is larger than the rewards 
for beating those earnings targets by one cent.  
Indeed, the evidence shows that the market rewards firms with certain earnings that 
constantly meet or beat earnings estimates by assigning a valuation premium and penalize those 
that do not meet such estimates (Barth, Elliott, & Finn, 1999). Meeting or beating a forecast 
benchmark also lowers the cost of capital and other business transactions (Trueman & Titman, 
1988), ensuring the trust of the stakeholders in the firm’s long-term success (Graham et al., 
2005). Thus, income smoothing may improve their firm’s standing with external stakeholder 
groups such as customers, suppliers, and creditors to earn better terms of trade or reduce 
financing constraints for shareholders, by signaling a positive impression to the market (Bartov 
et al., 2002; Cheng & Warfield, 2005).  
Beyond the consideration of shareholder interest, free market oriented CEOs have a 
greater tendency to attribute firm success and failure to their own efforts than their peers, which 
may be driven by strong economic individualism (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Thus, personal 
achievement is an important component of a free market oriented CEO to measure success in life 
(Feldman, 1988). While meeting earnings expectations and performance metrics is important for 
firms’ external legitimacy and recognition (e.g., Davdison et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2015) and is a 
wide-spread phenomenon among corporations (Bitner & Dolan, 1998), free market oriented 
CEOs have a greater tendency to consider a firm not meeting its performance metrics as a 
personal failure than their peers. For example, more than ninety five percent of the more than 
four hundred executives surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) preferred smooth earnings paths, 




Finally, free market oriented CEOs have a tendency to view the business environment as 
competition among firms for limited resources as well as investor funds (McClosky & Zaller, 
1984; Duckitt, 2006). Free market oriented CEOs are more likely to engage in income smoothing 
to beat the competition because they consider income smoothing as critical in their competition 
with other firms for market recognition and resources. Thus, certainty and predictability of 
earnings being one of the fundamental metrics of success for organizations (Chen et al., 2015) 
and given that smooth earnings is preferred by the vast majority of executives (Graham et al., 
2005), free market oriented CEOs are highly incentivized to take extra risk by engaging in 
income smoothing. While income smoothing involves earnings management that may be viewed 
as risky by potentially being perceived as misleading, free market oriented CEOs may consider it 
necessary to win the competition among firms for limited resources of the external environment. 
By engaging in income smoothing activities, they may consider winning this contest for 
resources rewarding both for their shareholders and themselves.  
In contrast, individuals low on free market orientation may consider that an organization 
has many other stakeholders beyond shareholders whose rights must be addressed and respected 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In this regard, individuals who rely on financial statements 
provided by a firm, such as regulators, analysts and possible future investors are also considered 
important stakeholders whose rights need to be addressed. Thus, income smoothing, which has a 
risk of potentially being perceived as not reflecting the underlying reality of the organization, is 
seen as inappropriate because it may inadvertently harm the interests of analysts, suppliers, 
creditors, and potential investors who may rely on this information to make their decisions.    
CEOs low on free market orientation may have no need for additional risk because they 




competition but a cooperative environment where the needs of all stakeholder must be met 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). As such, not meeting an earnings target or delivering predictable 
returns may, in their view, be attributed to factors that they have little control over with less 
urgency to match competitor results. Thus, though not delivering certain and predictable growth 
in earnings or not meeting or beating analyst forecasts is considered problematic, it is thought to 
be a lesser evil than taking a risk and potentially being perceived as misleading wider 
stakeholder groups, including investors seeking to invest money in a firm.  
Importantly, CEOs low on free market orientation may not be willing to take extra risk 
for the benefit of the owners of the firm as it may potentially lead to steep personal and 
organizational penalties. In contrast, free market oriented CEOs may consider the market as a 
competitive environment where additional risks need to be taken to reward themselves as well as 
shareholders. In short, the free market orientation of CEOs might not only significantly impact 
firm income smoothing because of their higher concern with shareholder rights, but also because 
of the extent of personal responsibility free market oriented CEOs attach to firm outcomes, and 
their view of the business environment as competition for limited resources where some risks 
need to be taken. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H1: The free market orientation of a CEO is positively related to income smoothing. 
 
E. Income Smoothing Strategies 
a. Real Activities Management 
Real activities management primarily involves deliberate management of firm sales, 
reduction of firm discretionary expenditures, and overproduction (Roychowdhury, 2006). Sales 




temporary price discounts or more lenient credit terms (Zhao, Chen, Zhang, & Davis, 2012). As 
such, increased sales relative to fixed and variable expenditures may decrease or increase firms 
reported earnings. Real activities management via reduction of discretionary expenditures 
primarily happens by manipulating expenditures on R&D, advertising, maintenance and other 
general administrative expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006). Hence, firms can increase or reduce 
reported earnings by managing the timing and scope of firm discretionary expenditures. Finally, 
real activities management may be achieved by producing more goods than necessary to meet 
expected demand (Zhao et al. 2012). Since overproduction involves producing more goods than 
necessary, firm fixed costs are divided over a larger quantity of finished products, effectively 
lowering cost per unit. Thus, assuming that this reduction in unit cost “is not offset by any 
increase in marginal cost per unit, total cost per unit declines … this implies that reported 
[production cost] is lower, and the firm reports better operating margins” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 
340). 
Overall real activities management as an income smoothing strategy is considered less 
risky personally for a CEO because it is within business operating decisions that an executive 
makes on a daily basis (Kim & Sohn, 2013) and thereby is less likely to be challenged. 
Nevertheless, free market oriented CEOs are less likely to pursue this option. First, real activities 
management involves engaging in business practices that harm shareholder value (Zhao et al., 
2012).  This happens because real activities management involves changes in a firm’s cash flow 
that limit the effective and efficient use of firm resources for a strategic advantage. Indeed, the 
increased sales volumes as a result of the price discounts are likely to lower cash flow in the 
future (Roychowdhury, 2006). Further, lenient credit terms to push higher sales may cut into 




current period may lower cash outflow in the current period, it may significantly impede future 
cash balance (Kim & Sohn, 2013). This may lead to missing investments into potentially 
profitable projects, impeding long term shareholder value.   
Further, the firm incurs production and holding costs on the over-produced items that are 
not recovered in the same period through sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). As a result, cash flows 
from operations are lower than normal given sales levels. All else equal, the incremental 
marginal costs incurred in producing the additional inventories result in higher annual production 
costs relative to sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, excessive price discounts and 
overproduction lead to abnormally high production costs relative to dollar sales. This may lead to 
abnormal under-production, a shortage of inventory for sales, loss of  loyal customers, and 
therefore impair the firm’s future profitability (Mizik, 2010). Thus, the net effect is a negative 
outcome for a shareholder. For example, Zhao et al. (2012) find that although abnormal real 
activities in general signal positive future performance, they are associated with lower future 
performance. Similarly, Zhang (2008) finds that real activities management lowers firm 
operational performance in years following firm engagement in real activities management. This 
overall negative impact of real activities management has been widely acknowledged by 
executives surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) as well, who suggested that it may be detrimental to 
shareholder value. 
Thus, given evidence that real activities management lowers future firm value (Zhao et 
al., 2012), free market oriented CEOs are not likely to pursue this option. This is likely because 
free market oriented CEOs generally have a stronger concern for private property rights of a 
shareholder (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). For example, Adam Smith, one of the intellectual 




breach of an individual's personal property is the next most severe crime (Smith, 2017). Thus, 
free market oriented CEOs are likely to believe that the private property of individuals needs to 
be protected even though it may involve forfeiting earnings benchmarks.  
Second, real activities managements involve changes in firm operational activities that 
harm both a firm’s operational (Helfat & Winter, 2001) and dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997). This happens because real activities management that involves acceleration of 
sales by increasing price discounts or lenient credit terms, reduction of discretionary 
expenditures, such as SG&A expense, advertising expense and R&D expense or overproduction 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), may impair necessary timely investments in firm operational and 
dynamic capabilities. Given that a firm generally operates in its optimal level under market 
conditions (Kim & Sohn, 2013), when it manipulates cash flow by changing operational 
activities, it changes its operation to a suboptimal level, constraining a firm’s competitive 
capabilities. Thus, real activity changes can inflate/deflate cash flow and other investments, 
impairing a firm’s operational benefits in the future (Graham et al., 2005). This suggests that 
necessary projects are not funded in a timely manner, impairing the long-term benefits of a 
firm’s operations and performance (Laverty, 1996) 
However, as suggested above, free market oriented CEOs have a strong preference for 
economic individualism, independence and a desire to compete (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). 
With real activities changes impairing firm future capabilities in the strategic arena, free market 
oriented CEOs are less likely to favor this strategy for income smoothing. This happens because 
while income smoothing via real activities management may be helpful to meet their goals of 
reaching earnings targets and benefiting current shareholder goals, it may impair their desire to 




among firms for limited resources and recognition. In summary, although real activities 
management is less risky for CEOs due to being associated within the authority of the CEO 
(Gunny, 2010), because free market oriented CEOs care more about shareholder rights, 
independence, and their competitive capability, they are less likely to undertake income 
smoothing via real activities management. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2: The free market orientation of CEOs is negatively related to real activities management as 
an income smoothing strategy.  
 
b. Accretive Stock Repurchases 
As suggested earlier, beyond real activities management, firms have an opportunity to 
engage in accretive stock repurchase as an income smoothing strategy, which involves stock 
repurchases in the open market by a firm specifically to manage its earnings targets (Hribar, 
Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006). While overall stock buy backs are generally interpreted as a firm’s 
attempt to increase its undervalued stock or reduce agency costs by returning excess cash 
(Eberhart & Siddique, 2004), accretive stock repurchases are specifically undertaken to influence 
a firm earning targets (e.g., Hribar, Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006; Burnett, Cripe, Martin, & 
McAllister, 2012). 
Accretive stock re-purchases as an income smoothing strategy is similarly less risky as 
real activity management because it is also considered within the operational discretion of CEOs 
(Bryan & Mason, 2016). Thus, they are less likely to be challenged by regulators or any other 
external party (Burnett, Cripe, Martin, & McAllister, 2012). While free market oriented CEOs 
may seek to return excess cash to shareholders through stock repurchases and dividends (Jensen, 




Stock repurchases have an impact on earnings targets via two means (Farrell, Unlu, & 
Yu, 2014). First, stock repurchases that occur at the beginning of the period are deducted from 
shares outstanding for the full period, increasing earnings per share. Second, because stock 
repurchase requires a cash payout, this cash outflow decreases earnings by the amount of any 
foregone return on cash used (or interest expense incurred on cash borrowed) for repurchases. 
Stock repurchases increase earnings only when the foregone return (or interest expense incurred) 
on the cash paid out is less than the firm’s earnings-to-price ratio at the time of the buyback (see 
Bens, Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003). 
While share repurchases that are undertaken to distribute excess cash should be 
shareholder-friendly by delivering short-term gains for investors through increased stock price 
(Jensen, 1987; 1993), accretive stock repurchases to smooth reported income “may exact a long-
term toll” on owners of the firm (Brettell, Gaffen, & Rohde, 2015). The accretive stock 
repurchase to manage earnings “can create perverse incentives to pay out too much cash, 
damaging firms’ ... ability to invest” (The Economist, 2014), reducing their focus on 
“innovations that can drive growth” (Trainer, 2016).  
These accretive stock repurchases create a short-term relief through beating earning 
targets at the expense of investing in assets, research and development or increasing hiring 
(Russolillo, 2014). This negative impact of cash shortage for a firm beyond a certain level was 
first highlighted by Jensen (1987) in The Free Cash Flow Theory. Indeed, the cash spent on share 
repurchases is not spent on capital expenditures, acquisitions or research and development that 
could help a company grow in the long run. For example, in a more recent study, Almedia, Fos, 
and Kronlund (2016) find that an increase in share repurchases made by firms that would have a 




corporate policies that may damage a long term firm value. These companies were found to 
decrease employment, capital expenditures, and R&D in the four quarters following increases in 
repurchases motivated by earnings targets, relative to companies that just meet analyst earnings 
forecasts. Similarly, Nguyen, Vu, and Yin (2015) found that firm share re-purchases are 
negatively associated with firm current and future innovation. However, firm investments in 
capital expenditures, R&D, and innovation have long been considered an important signal of 
firm buffering from the external environment (Lev, 1975). Thus, because free market oriented 
CEOs consider the business environment as competition for limited resources and investor funds 
(McClosky & Zaller, 1984), they care about maintaining their firm competitiveness and 
independence. As such, they cannot take actions that impede these critical investments that 
signal their capability and competence to compete.  
Beyond worries of impeding future firm investments, it may signal incompetence of the 
CEO to use the cash on hand for projects that deliver value that the firm is eager to return cash 
back to its owners (Bendig, Willmann, Strese, & Brettel, 2018). In fact these findings were 
discovered by Grullon and Michaely (2004), who found that firms with poor growth 
opportunities reduce investment and direct resources towards share repurchases.  Similarly, 
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2013) found that share repurchases were associated with poor 
investment opportunities. Farrell, Yu, and Zhang (2013) found that growth firms were less likely 
to engage in earnings management through stock repurchases.  
However, free market oriented CEOs are over focused on personal achievement and 
over-attribute firm failure and success to themselves due to stronger individualism than their 
peers (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Thus, they generally do not like to be viewed as incapable of 




demonstrate that the CEO does not have profitable projects to invest in for a better use for 
shareholder’s money. With stock repurchases being one of the commonly known signals of an 
absence of profitable projects by a firm (e.g., Bendig et al., 2018), free market oriented CEOs are 
less likely to pursue accretive stock repurchases as an income smoothing strategy. 
Importantly, stock repurchases tend to reduce organizational cash (Almeida et al., 2016). 
Cash has been known as an important element of organizational slack that reduces a firm’s 
environmental dependence, buffering a firm from environmental threats (Dess & Beard, 1984; 
Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). This will impact the perceived independence of the 
CEO from the external environment. Because free market oriented CEOs have a strong desire for 
independence from the external environment (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), they are less likely to 
give up cash, a form of organizational slack (Kim & Bettis, 2014) that has been known to buffer 
organization from adverse impact of the external environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). Thus, with 
cash being important for long-term investments that reduce firm dependence on its environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), free market oriented CEOs are less likely to desire to use cash for 
accretive stock repurchase that may significantly reduce firm investment capability (Nguyen et 
al., 2015). In summary, free market oriented CEOs generally do not favor accretive stock 
repurchases as a method to achieve income smoothing because of its strategic harm to their 
desire to be independent and competitive as well as potential negative impacts on firm 
capabilities. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H3: The free market orientation of CEOs will be negatively related to stock repurchases 






c. Discretionary Accounting Accruals 
A third widely accepted strategy for income smoothing involves increasing or decreasing 
discretionary accounting accruals (e.g., Zang, 2011; Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & Lodth, 2015). 
Under generally accepted accounting principles, companies use accrual accounting, whereby 
income is recognized when it is earned and expenses, when they are incurred, regardless of when 
cash is received or disbursed (Davdison et al., 2004). Thus, accrual accounting gives managers 
some discretion in determining reported earnings (Hadani et al., 2011). Specifically, 
management has a great deal of control over the timing of actual expenditures and also has some 
ability to alter the timing of recognition of revenues and expenses. For example, by advancing 
recognition of sales revenue through credit sales, or delaying recognition of losses, 
decreasing/increasing estimates of bad debt reserves, warranty costs, and inventory write-downs, 
by waiting to establish loss reserves (Teoh et al., 1998a, b), they may decrease or increase 
reported earnings. This involves management of the firm’s reported earnings in the financial 
statements, using “purposeful” judgment in reporting expenses or revenue (Hadani et al., 2011). 
Income smoothing through discretionary accounting accrual managements are generally 
considered riskier for a CEO (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). This is because, 
unlike with real activities management or accretive stock repurchases, which are more of 
operational decisions, decisions about discretionary accounting accruals are subject to higher 
scrutiny by auditors, regulators, and investors especially post accounting scandals with Enron 
and WorldCom (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, as suggested earlier, when engaging in income 
smoothing “the line between legitimacy and outright fraud [being] vague” (Chong, 2006:43), 




Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean free market oriented CEOs will not take a risk in 
order to protect shareholder value.  
I argue that the free market orientation of CEOs is positively related to the use of 
discretionary accounting accrual managements as an income smoothing strategy. This happens 
because, as suggested earlier, while other forms of income smoothing, such as real activities and 
stock repurchase involve some form of influence on firm business operations (Roychowdhury, 
2006), such as research and development or innovation, discretionary accruals do not involve 
real changes in firm business operations or cash flow (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008). Thus, unlike 
real activities management or stock repurchases, discretionary accruals have a lesser long-term 
consequence for firm strategic capabilities (Zang, 2011). This makes discretionary accruals 
especially useful in smoothing the income of the firm with no or limited impact on firm 
operational capabilities of a firm. 
I suggest this is an important factor for free market oriented CEOs who deeply care about 
maintaining their firm strategic capability and reducing environmental dependence. Thus, due to 
strong economic individualism (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), free market oriented CEOs care 
about their degree of dependence from the environment and consider their strategic 
competitiveness important for their firm’s survival. This suggests they are less likely to 
manipulate business operations for a short-term gain not to impede firm capabilities (Laverty, 
1996). They are equally unlikely to desire to use cash, an organizational slack critical for 
buffering a firm from environmental dependence (Tan & Peng, 2003). As such, they are unlikely 
to postpone necessary strategic investments or expenditures. This may significantly safeguard 
firm strategic operational (Helfat & Winter, 2011) and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). 




accrual to real-based earnings management leads to a much larger decrease in firm performance. 
Similar findings were reported by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Roychowdhury, Kothari, and 
Mizik (2012). They found that managing earnings at the time of raising additional equity via 
discretionary accruals is better than real activities because the latter is more costly in the long 
run. Thus, income smoothing through discretionary accruals while personally risky (Cohen et al., 
2008), may allow free market oriented CEOs to maintain these capabilities while achieving the 
objectives of delivering on a promise and maintaining a sense of personal competence.  
Relatedly, while this approach bears a risk of being perceived as deceitful for investors 
because it may be recognized as not reflecting the underlying true performance of the firm, 
accounting accrual management allows free market oriented CEOs to shield the market from 
earnings surprises, protecting overall shareholder value (Dechow, 1994) as well as contributing 
to the external recognition of CEO competency (Chen et al., 2015). While CEOs with low free 
market orientation may be unwilling to take a risk and potentially be perceived as misleading 
because of earnings management, free market oriented CEOs care more about the overall value 
of current shareholder assets and are thereby willing to risk to be seen as untruthful. Taking a 
higher risk of being perceived as misleading to market participants and other organizational 
stakeholders, including current shareholders of the firm, free market oriented CEOs demonstrate 
their care for current shareholder well-being. This is consistent with the findings of Hutton et al. 
(2015) that found that firms with Republican-leaning management engage in more civil rights, 
labor, and environmental litigation. Hutton et al. (2015) argued that because Republican-leaning 
managers stress the importance of property rights, they are willing to engage in litigation to 
protect shareholder interests, i.e., risk on behalf of a shareholder. Francis et al. (2016) similarly 




which could also be a demonstration of a higher risk taking on behalf of shareholders by 
Republican leaning executives, who tend to be more free market oriented than their Democratic 
counterparts (Jackson et al., 2003; Koger et al., 2010). This is consistent with the notion that free 
market oriented individuals generally support less government and lower taxes for the benefit of 
the property owners (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Thus, taking the extra risk of being found 
deceitful through discretionary accrual management free market oriented CEOs benefit the firm 
owners as well as their quest to prevail in the competitive environment. 
Finally, free market oriented CEOs may prefer discretionary accruals to real activities 
management and accretive stock repurchases, because these discretionary decisions can take 
place right before or after the fiscal year end (Zang, 2011), when the need for income smoothing 
is actually realized, whereas real activities management or accretive stock repurchase decisions 
need to be planned and executed prior to the end of the reporting period (Gunny, 2010). This is 
important, because free market oriented CEOs are more focused on strategic capabilities and 
competitiveness of their firms than their peers’ driven by strong economic individualism and a 
desire for competitiveness. While income smoothing strategies via real activities management or 
accretive stock repurchases may require advance preparation and execution in the beginning or 
over the course of the reporting period, free market oriented CEOs may be more focused on 
competition in the business environment first as a means to beat their earning targets and use the 
income smoothing strategy as the last resort, when market means of influence on earnings is not 
sufficient for desirable results so as not to harm shareholder interests. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H4: The free market orientation of CEOs will be positively related to discretionary 






a. Sample and Research Design 
 Based on several considerations, my sample consisted of CEOs from the Execucomp 
database, who were appointed to their positions in years 2008 and 2009. I identified 444 CEO 
transitions in the years 2008 and 2009 in Execucomp. Out of these 102 were either acquired, 
merged with another company or a CEO lost his or her position prior to 2010, 48 did not have 
any earnings calls for the period of 2010 and 2011, and 63 never had any earnings calls in 
SeekingAlpha.com, a crowd-sourced web content service for financial markets that supplies 
public company earnings conference calls. This left me with 231 CEOs that had at least one 
earnings call in the years 2010 and 2011. However, to maintain consistency with previous 
research that has utilized ten consecutive periods of political donations to construct a political 
ideology measure (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017a,b; Briscoe et al., 2014) and to 
capture stability of the measure across quarterly earnings calls (Chin et al., 2013), my final 
sample comprises CEOs who had earnings calls covering at least half of the period of 2010 and 
2011, which leaves me with a final sample of 140 earnings calls  with at least four quarterly 
earnings calls in SeekingAlpha.com.  
The data for dependent variables is collected from COMPUSTAT as well as I/B/E/S that 
provides the relevant earnings forecasts and actual figures for publicly traded firms. The 
independent variable, free market orientation, was constructed via CATA (content analysis) 
using earnings calls transcripts of quarterly earnings conference calls for two consecutive years 
following a firm CEO being appointed to his or her position (2010-2011). I measured dependent 
variables for each year a CEO was in office between 2012 and 2016, designated as t+n, up to 




dependent variables of interest for five years for that firm (2012-2016). After missing data, this 
framework yielded a pooled time-series of 285 firm-year observations for my income smoothing 
hypothesis.  
Independent variable: The relevant indicators of free market orientation of CEOs (economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights) is measured by dividing the number of words 
spoken by a focal CEO that match the relevant synonyms of each indicator of free market 
orientation in quarterly earnings conference calls to the total number of words spoken by the 
CEO. These three indicators are averaged and loaded into one factor (see my second dissertation 
paper on measurement of free market orientation).  
Income smoothing: Consistent with prior research (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et 
al., 1999), I use the following three target thresholds that prior research suggests that executives 
care about when they report earnings: 1) positive profits 2) sustaining recent performance, and 3) 
meet analysts’ expectations. Positive profit is measured as a dummy code whether earnings per 
share  for a given quarter exceed zero at least by one cent. Sustained recent performance is 
measured whether current quarterly performance is higher than last year’s same quarter 
performance at least by one cent. Meeting analyst’s expectations is measured as quarterly actual 
earnings meeting and exceeding most recent analysts’ consensus earnings forecast. If all three 
criteria are met in a given quarter, a firm is considered engaging in income smoothing. If at least 
one of those measures is not met, then a firm is considered not engaging in income smoothing. If 
these conditions are not met, the indicator variable is set to zero. Quarterly measures are summed 
to obtain yearly measure of income smoothing.  
Real activities management: I use three real activities-based earnings management 




based on the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, production costs, and discretionary 
expenses. These measures are used to detect behaviors such as acceleration of the timing of sales 
through increased price discounts, reporting of the lower cost of goods sold through increased 
production, and decreases in discretionary expenses that include advertising, research and 
development, and SG&A expenses. Specifically, I derive normal levels of cash flow from 
operations (CFO), discretionary expenses and productions costs for every firm-year. Deviations 
from the normal levels are termed abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. The measures of abnormal cash flow, production costs, and discretionary 
expenditures are standardized and summed. 
To identify abnormal cash flow, following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. 
(2008), I express normal cash flow from operations as a linear function of sales and change in 
sales in the current period. To estimate the model, I run the following cross-sectional regression 
for every industry and year:  
(1)  , where At is the 
total assets at the end of period t, St the sales during period t and ∆ St =St-St-1.  
 For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations is the actual CFO minus the 
‘‘normal’’ CFO calculated using estimated coefficients from the corresponding industry-year 
model and the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets. The model for normal COGS will be 
estimated as: (2)   




(3) , where ∆ INV is the change 
in inventory in period t.  Production costs (PROD t) are COGS t+ ∆INV t. Thus, using (2) and 
(3), I estimate normal production costs from the following industry-year regression: 
  (4)  
Finally, the relevant regression for discretionary expenses is :  
, where DISEXP t is discretionary 
expenses in period t.  
Accretive stock repurchases: To identify firms engaging in earnings management 
through accretive stock repurchases, I follow prior research by Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson 
(2006) and Burnett et al. (2012). This research identifies share repurchase as accretive share 
repurchase if a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) with the repurchase is higher than by at least one 
cent than EPS with the assumption of no share buybacks. For example, when EPS with the 
buyback is greater than as-if EPS with the assumption of no buyback by at least one cent. I 
compute the value a firm's EPS would have taken if it did not engage in share repurchases as 
follows. 
, 
where NI t is the reported earnings available to common shareholders for the fiscal quarter, 
SHARESOUT, the shares outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal quarter, and 
SHARESISSUED, the number of shares issued during the quarter, and OPP_COST, the 




Had a firm not engaged in share repurchases, it would have also avoided the opportunity 
cost attributable to not earning a return on the cash it expended for the repurchases, meaning that 
this opportunity cost must be added to the numerator of EPS to remove the effect of the share 
repurchases. Following Hribar et al. (2006) and Burnett et al. (2012), I first determine whether a 
firm had excess cash on hand that could be used to conduct the share repurchases or whether a 
firm had to borrow cash to carry out the repurchases, because each scenario affects the 
calculation of the opportunity cost differently. I consider a firm's excess cash to be cash greater 
than 6% of total assets for retail firms or 2% of total assets for any other type of firm (Burnett et 
al., 2012; Copeland, Koller, &Murrin, 2000; Hribar et al., 2006). The opportunity cost of the 
cash expended for the portion of the share repurchase that does not exceed the amount of the 
firm's excess cash is calculated as the dollar amount of the share repurchase (up to the amount of 
the firm's excess cash) multiplied by the three-month treasury bill rate, while the opportunity cost 
of the cash expended for the portion of the share repurchase that exceeds the amount of the firm's 
excess cash is calculated as the dollar amount of the share repurchase that exceeds the firm's 
excess cash multiplied by the firm's average interest rate (Burnett et al., 2012; Hribar et al., 
2006). For a given quarter, a firm's average interest rate is calculated as its interest expense 
divided by its average debt (Burnett et al., 2012; Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 2005). Consistent 
with Burnett et al. (2012), if information necessary to determine a firm's average interest rate is 
unavailable then I use the average industry interest rate, with industries defined using 2-digit SIC 
codes.  Then, consistent with Hribar et al. (2006) and Burnett et al. (2012), I use marginal tax 
rates to determine the after-tax amount of the opportunity cost. I utilize marginal tax rates 
available in the Compustat Marginal Tax Rates database. The yearly measure of accretive stock 




Accounting accruals management: Following previous research (Hadani et al., 2011), I 
measure accounting accruals management, by using the modified Jones model (1991). This 
model has been widely used to detect a firm discretionary accounting management as an earnings 
management strategy in accounting (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995), finance (Guay, 
Kothari, & Watts, 1996), and management literature (e.g. Davdison et al., 2004; Chen et al., 
2015). The model considers the difference between the firm's actual and expected accruals as the 
estimate of earnings management. Actual accruals are measured as the difference between 
reported earnings and operating cash flows. Expected accruals is computed by regressing total 
accruals in the firm's 2-digit SIC-code industry on total assets, revenues, property, plant, and 
equipment, and accounts receivable.  
Control variables: I control for common factors that may impact differences in 
executive behavior, such as firm size, measured as firm total assets, prior firm performance, 
measured as the lagged value of firm return on assets, and firm recent market performance, 
measured as the lagged value of stock a Tobin’s Q1.  I also control for common CEO attributes, 
such as CEO duality, measured as whether a CEO is also chair of the board, CEO equity, 
measured as percent of firm stocks owned by a focal CEO, and prior CEO variable pay, 
measured as the lagged value of stock awards and options,  that may potentially impact firm 
income smoothing activities. Finally, I control for income smoothing strategies when running my 
models on income smoothing and other income smoothing strategies when hypothesizing a 
relationship between free market orientation of a CEO and forms of income smoothing. 
 
                                                 




b. Selection Correction 
Since my measure of CEO free market orientation is based on CEOs with at least four 
earnings calls over a two year period, I must account for the selection process that allows for one 
executive to be in my sample while others are not. To do so, I conducted a first stage model 
predicting inclusion in my sample based upon theoretically meaningful variables that may impact 
the likelihood of having earnings conference calls. Specifically, I conduct a probit analysis 
utilizing firm performance, firm size, CEO pay, CEO variable pay, and firm market performance 
as well as year dummy variables to predict inclusion in the sample. I rely on these variables, to 
the exclusion of a unique instrumental variable, because theoretically these firm and CEO 
attributes may impact the likelihood of having earnings conference calls. I then calculated the 
inverse Mills ratio and included this selection correction in the second stage analysis to account 
for possible selection bias. Results of this first stage analysis are included in Table 4 of the 
Appendix and provide results that three of my instruments (firm performance, CEO variable pay, 
and overall CEO pay) are statistically significantly associated with the likelihood of a firm 
having a quarterly earnings conference calls.   
 
c. Estimation Methods 
I have both continuous and count variables in my proposed hypotheses. In Hypotheses 1 
and 3, since the dependent variables are the  number of times a firm engaged in income 
smoothing and number of times a firm engaged in accretive stock repurchases, i.e. counts 
variables, I use a panel Poisson regression (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). A Poisson specification 
(poisson command in Stata15.0) ensures that zero values of the dependent variable are 




estimation technique is common in management research when dealing with count variables 
(e.g., Katilla & Ahuja, 2002; Williamson & Cable, 2003). 
I used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to deal with multiple observations 
for my dependent variables for hypotheses 2 and 4. GEE, which derives maximum likelihood 
estimates and accommodates non-independent observations, is suitable when using cross-
sectional time series data (Liang and Zeger, 1986). I did not use a fixed-effects model because it 
is not appropriate when models include time invariant variables (such as free market orientation). 
More specifically, I used the xtgee command in Stata 15.0, which fits general linear models and 
allows me to specify the within-group correlation structure for the panels (StataCorp, 2012). 
Because using the Wooldridge test of autocorrelation (via the Stata command "xtserial"), I 
rejected the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation, I specified a Gaussian (normal) 
distribution with AR1 correlation structure.  I have used robust variance estimators (White, 
1980) for all regressions in my models. 
 
G. Results 
Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables.  Table 
2 presentes Poisson regression results for tests of my hypotheseses on income smoothing and 
accretive stock repurchases. Model 1 and 3 present regression of dependent variables of interest 
on control variables. Model 2 of Table 2 tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that free market 
orientation is positively related to income smoothing. The results show a significant positive 
effect of free market orientation on firm income smoothing, providing strong support for 
Hypothesis 1(p<0.05). In practical terms, results for Hypothesis 1 suggest that one standard 




income smoothing.  Model 4 tests the main effect of free market orientation on accretive stock 
repurchases. The results show some support for Hypothesis 3. Specifically, while the direction of 
the coefficient is in the expected direction, the coefficient of the independent variable is 
significant only at 0.1 level (p<0.1). In practical terms, this hypothesis suggests that one standard 
deviation increase in CEO free market orientation is associated with 0.05 fewer accretive stock 
repurchases.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and 2 here 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents GEE results for tests of my hypotheses on real activities and 
discretionary accounting accruals respectively. Model 5 and 7 include only control variables. 
Model 6 tests the main effect of free market orientation on real activities and indicates that free 
market orientation was negatively associated with real activities, but this association fails to 
reach significance level (p>0.05). Thus, I did not find support that free market oriented CEOs are 
less likely to engage in real activities management as an income smoothing strategy.  In Model 8, 
I test Hypothesis 4, which predicts that free market orientation is positively associated with 
discretionary accounting accruals. The results show a significant positive effect for the 
relationship, providing strong support for Hypothesis 4 (p<0.05). In practical terms, this 
hypothesis suggests that for one standard deviation increase in free market orientation from its 
mean increases the engagement in discretionary accruals increases by thirty seven percent.  
--------------------------------------- 






The notion that individuals’ economic values influence their decisions has been of some 
interest to scholars in multiple disciplines while political ideology has largely been conflated 
with individual’s social values in management research. Economic values or free market 
orientation, distinct and largely independent dimension of individuals’ political ideology, 
epitomize a range of values and beliefs on the supremacy of an individual’s autonomy, 
competition, and property rights. In the context of organizations, these values speak to the 
advantage of market mechanisms in interactions among individuals and parties. As such, a fuller 
understanding of an individuals’ political ideology begins with unpacking how individual’s 
economic values influence their actions and strategies. It is through referring to these ascribed 
economic values and beliefs on how the economy and a free market functions scholars can come 
to gain more nuanced understanding of organizational outcomes associated with diverging 
economic philosophies in terms of the underlying role of corporations in society, such as the 
supremacy of shareholder interests, the extent of organizational interdependence, and the 
embrace of fierce competition rather cooperation in the marketplace. Thus, given the subject of 
political ideology research are executives of large corporations, research will benefit more from 
exploring their economic philosophies or free market orientation rather broad political ideology 
that is more focused on psychological needs, such as need for certainty and security, that are less 
likely to be associated with winners of executive filtering or tournament style succession (Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981) to rise in organizational ranks (Schneider, 1987) that require openness to 
change and risk-taking.  
This paper advanced an idea that executive free market orientation impacts their firm 




engage in greater income smoothing, but also make an active choice among available income 
smoothing strategies. Free market oriented CEOs were argued to engage in greater discretionary 
accounting accruals, while avoiding real activities and accretive stock repurchases as an income 
smoothing strategies because the latter are overall more misaligned with their economic values 
than the former. Specifically, real activities and accretive stock repurchases may be overall 
harmful to shareholder interests and impede desire of free market oriented CEOs to maintain 
their economic independence and competitiveness in the market place. I find significant support 
for two of my hypotheses. Specifically, I find that free market orientation is positively related 
with firm engagement in income smoothing and the use of discretionary accounting accruals as 
income smoothing strategy. I also find that free market oriented CEOs were less likely to engage 
in accretive stock repurchases as income smoothing strategy. While I find that free market 
orientation of CEOs is negativelty related with real activities management, this relationship fails 
to reach significance level.  
 This research contributes to management field in multiple ways. First, by testing the 
impact of CEO free market orientation on firm income smoothing, I test the idea that support of 
economic inidividualism, competition, and property rights indeed involves taking risks on behalf 
of shareholders of the firm. Second, I find that free market oriented CEOs are more likely to 
pursue an income smoothing strategy, which is overall risky both for them and their firms but 
less harmful to shareholders and more aligned with their desire for economic independence and 
competitiveness. This is important because the extant conceptualization of political ideology 
portrays free market oriented executives as driven by psychological needs for certainty and risk 
aversion (e.g., Christensen et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2014; Elnahas & Kim, 2017). However, 




& Jonas, 2003). By testing the risk tolerance of free market oriented executives, I contribute to a 
more nuanced understanding of economic values or free market orientation in the upper echelons 
of an organization. This advances the field of upper echelons research towards more precise 
measures of executive ideological beliefs and values. This is also salient to view CEO attitudes 
towards competition and dependence in the marketplace (McClosky & Zaller, 1984) since 
income smoothing strategies also diverge in their impact on future firm capabilities and external 
dependence (Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, this research opens up avenues for future research 
that may uncover important outcomes associated with these new executive values. 
 Importantly, although the presence of a higher faith in capitalism and free markets in 
conservatives in comparison to liberals has been noted in the current political ideology research 
(e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Chin & Semadani, 2017), this has largely been interpreted as the support 
of the status quo or aversion to change (Jost et al., 2003). This paper is the first to my knowledge 
to highlight and test an individual’s economic values as an independent and distinct component 
of an individual’s political ideology not necessarily tied to his or her psychological existential 
needs. In clear contrast to conformant and risk-averse depiction of the supporters of a free market 
conceptualized in the unidimensional liberalism-conservatism construct of political ideology, this 
paper demonstrates that free market orientation in fact may seem to encourage uncertainty and 
change (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).  
An important and potentially generative avenue for future research is to empirically 
investigate the impact of the executive free market orientation – support for economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights, three dimensions of free market orientation on 
other organizational outcomes beyond income smoothing. For example, recognizing that 




market orientation- that is, when he or she has high economic individualism- provides direction 
for an expanded and fruitful research agenda. An interesting question to pursue is whether and 
how this economic individualism impacts a firm desire to lobby government. For example, a 
CEO high in economic individualism may have strong tendencies to avoid government assistance 
in competing with other firms. Thus, by actively pursuing autonomy and economic 
individualism, free market oriented CEOs may be putting their firms at a significant 
disadvantage compared to other firms. Alternatively, the desire to control its own fate may push 
these free market oriented CEOs to lobby more than their peers.  
 Also, particularly interesting for future research is further exploration of competitive behavior of 
free market oriented executives. A tournament style competitive environment within an 
organization through high pay inequity and unevenness in internal resource allocation within 
business units may not be the only visible demonstration of the support for competition for these 
executives (Gupta et al., 2017b). This behavior may be present in the competitive dynamics of 
the firm as well as it responds to external threats and opportunities. Exploring how a CEO free 
market orientation impacts a firm response to potential competitive attack may enrich both upper 
echelons and competitive dynamics literature. While CEOs with a low free market orientation 
may prefer to counter the attack with the offer of cooperation for a mutual benefit, CEOs with a 
high free market orientation may choose confrontation.  
 Exploring the effect of the dimensions of a free market orientation on organizational contracting 
with its suppliers is another intriguing avenue for future research. While we know that free 
market oriented executives may want autonomy from their suppliers, we may not know whether 
they prefer either short-term or long-term contracts with external suppliers.  This is because both 




from external entities. While short-term contracts may offer a flexibility of a relationship, 
important to maintain autonomy, long term contracting may be a way to sustain autonomy 
through limiting oneself from short term market fluctuations. 
 While this paper has argued for independent and complementary effects of beliefs in economic 
individualism, competition, and property rights, potential interactive effects may persist among 
power holders within the organization that bear similar free market orientation. One intriguing 
possibility is the interacting effect of board and CEO free market orientation on dividend payout. 
Because free market oriented executives advocate shareholder primacy due to their higher 
support of property rights, free market orientation of the boards may be associated with overall 
higher dividend announcements. However, the economic individualism dimension of a free 
market oriented CEO may actually trump this tendency given a CEO desire to maintain strong 
autonomy from external parties. Future research may greatly benefit from exploring these 
interacting effects of multiple dimensions of a free market orientation. 
As with any research, natural limitations of this paper exist that warrant further 
investigation.  While the use of CATA techniques and validation methods to capture a construct 
utilized in this paper has widely been used in previous research the use of alternate validation 
techniques to further validate this novel measure is likely to be of significant next step to 
advance wider use of this measure. One alternate option is comparing CATA based measure of 
free market orientation of politicians whose economic values has been publicly declared. For 
example, a socialist Democrat, Bernie Sanders should have lower CATA based free market 
orientation score than libertarian Rand Paul, who is known to widely aspire free market ideals. 
Alternatively, a survey of a certain number of executives may be conducted to compare it to their 




techniques to further validate this novel measure that may become an important measure to 
capture executive economic philosophies.   
Further, since finance literature has multiple proxies for the construct of income 
smoothing, the use of three proxies as suggested in this paper may not reliably reflect firm 
income smoothing activity. In fact, executives may have divergent views of what “smooth 
income” is, leading to multiple interpretations of the goal of achieving smooth earnings. Future 
research might investigate these divergent views and how executive free market influences these 
multiple approaches to income smoothing. 
In summary, this paper recognizes the salience of economic values in understanding how 
organizations behave in fundamentally divergent views on the role of corporations in society. 
Specifically, by testimg the impact of CEO free market orientation on firm income smoothing 
strategies, this paper takes a first step in gaining a more nuanced understanding of how 
executives fundamentally differ in terms of shareholder-stakeholder debate, economic 
interdependence and belief in competition as a means for advancement and economic progress. 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Mea
n 






1 Free Market 
Orientation 
0.0 1.0 1.0 
2 Income Smoothing 2.0 1.4 0.1 1.0 
3 Real Activities -0.3 1.6 0.0 0.2 1.0 
4 Accretive Stock 
Repurchases 
0.1 0.4 0.0 -
0.1 
0.1 1.0 
5 Discretionary Accruals 49.1 239.
0 
0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 







7 CEO Ownership 0.6 0.7 0.0 -
0.1 
0.1 0.1 0.1 -
0.1 
1.0 







9 Firm Performance 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 
1
0 


































Table 2. Results from poisson regression with robust standard errors 









CEO Duality 0.03 0.06 -1.28** -1.31**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.43) (0.44) 
CEO Ownership -0.12 -0.14* 0.30 0.41 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.38) (0.34) 
CEO Variable Pay -0.15 -0.18* 1.04** 1.01** 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.39) (0.36) 
Firm Performance 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.74 
(0.35) (0.33) (1.29) (0.90) 
Firm Size 0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Market 
Performance 
0.03 0.04 -0.63 -0.61*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.36) (0.31) 
Real Activities 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.22 






Standard errors in parentheses; year and succession time dummies in all models 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, ˚ p < 0.1
Table 2 (Cont.) 











-0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
-0.77*** -0.82*** 1.49 1.33 





Constant 2.32** 2.67** -24.55*** -22.63***
(0.82) (0.82) (5.05) (4.69) 
N 285 285 347 347 
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Table 3. Results from GEE with autocorrelation and robust standard errors 
(Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) 




CEO duality -0.32 -0.33 -41988.50 -34861.66
(0.36) (0.38) (65436.66) (64459.83) 
CEO ownership -0.07 -0.07 142.85 37.20 
(0.09) (0.09) (290.76) (211.50) 
CEO Variable Pay 0.06 0.06 392.53 135.98 
(0.17) (0.17) (401.87) (286.50) 
Firm Performance 0.63 0.63 -719.16 -812.52**
(0.51) (0.51) (393.05) (312.85) 
Firm Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.04** -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Market 
Performance 
0.19* 0.19* 332.80 249.75 
(0.09) (0.09) (227.73) (162.69) 
Accretive Stock 
Repurchase 
-0.00 -0.00 152.98 171.37 






Table 3 (Cont.) 
(Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) 














Constant -1.40 -1.41 127469.78** 128179.68** 
(1.14) (1.18) (45293.35) (45615.15) 
N 355 355 325 325 
Standard errors in parentheses; year and succession dummies in all models. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4. Selection Correction First Stage Model 
Firm Size 0.00 
(0.00) 
Firm Performance 0.85*** 
(0.24) 
Firm Market Performance -0.02
(0.03) 
CEO Pay 0.00*** 
(0.00) 





Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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V. Conclusion
I began this dissertation with the underlying reasons for a need to explore executive 
economic values for understanding the fundamental roles of corporations in society. To make my 
case, I drew from research in political psychology and political science as well as synthesized 
extant empirical research in executive political ideology through the prism of executive 
economic values or free market orientation. I developed a novel measure to capture executive 
free market orientation through computer assisted textual analysis as well as demonstrated its 
distinctiveness from the traditional liberalism-conservatism measure. Further, I empirically 
demonstrated that free market oriented CEOs engage in greater income smoothing than their 
peers. I also found that free market oriented CEOs are more likely to pursue discretionary 
accounting accruals as an income smoothing strategy. Taken together, the findings presented in 
this dissertation provide important evidence that executive economic values are the distinct and 
independent dimension of executive political ideology. It also advances the idea that free market 
oriented CEOs are more likely to choose personally more risky income smoothing strategies to 
protect shareholder value and overall competitiveness of their firms in the market place. This 
dissertation uncovers a new avenue of research in upper echelons research. It is my hope that this 
dissertation is the first step in investigating critical organizational outcomes associated with 
executive economic values. In an era, when corporations are increasingly urged to act as 
corporate citizens, ignoring executive economic beliefs that are largely distinct of their social 
values disfavors managerial scholars to contribute to the debate about the roles of corporations in 
responding to emerging societal issues. 
